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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent decades, the United States has experienced a wave of immigration, an 
economic recession, and several terroristic attacks. In response, the government has 
scapegoated and blamed undocumented immigrants of color for recent social ills. As a 
result, a large share of government resources has been allocated to the enforcement and 
processing of immigration violations. Consequently, the number of immigration cases 
processed in U.S. federal courts has spiraled to nearly 50% of bookings and 34% of 
federal sentencing cases. Yet, immigration offenses have received little empirical 
attention in the courts and sentencing literature due in part to differences in the way 
immigration offenses are processed compared to other federal offense types, and 
relatedly, the empirical difficulties immigration offenses pose for analysis. Nevertheless, 
the increased representation of immigration offenses in federal courts, along with the 
punitive rhetoric and heightened social control targeting undocumented immigrants of 
color, warrants a comprehensive assessment of how immigration cases are processed in 
U.S. federal courts. Accordingly, this dissertation seeks to identify inequality in the 
processing of immigration cases by examining: 1) cumulative disadvantage within 
immigration cases; 2) contextual disparity and how social context interacts with ethnicity 
to influence multiple federal court outcomes within immigration cases; and 3) ethnic 
disparity within immigration cases over time.  
Data come from the Federal Justice Statistics Program Data Series, the U.S. 
Census, the Uniform Crime Reports, Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, the 
National Judicial Center, and the U.S. Department of Justice. The quantitative analysis 
addresses the first question by employing a cumulative disadvantage approach where 
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multiple decision points are considered and the effects of prior stages on subsequent 
outcomes. The quantitative analysis proceeds to address the second question by using 
multilevel modeling for multiple court outcomes. The longitudinal analysis is separately 
conducted on sentence length for 18-year data, from 1994 through 2012, to assess racial 
and ethnic disparity over time. 
The results indicate that cumulative disadvantage is present within immigration 
cases, that social context influences certain decision points, and that ethnic disparity has 
diminished over time in some districts.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free” 
-Emma Lazarus 
 The past three decades have seen an unprecedented number of immigration cases 
processed in U.S. federal courts due in part to the intersection of the criminal justice and 
civil immigration systems – a process that has been termed crimmigration (see Stumpf, 
2006). Crimmigration refers to recent policies and legislation that have criminalized 
many civil immigration violations and have attached civil sanctions to criminal offenses 
committed by noncitizens (Legomsky, 2007). In addition, enforcement of criminal 
immigration offenses has significantly increased at the local, state, and federal levels 
(Provine, Varsanyi, Lewis, & Decker, 2016), and the criminal and civil court systems 
have become dependent on one another in a way that diminishes the due process rights of 
defendants in criminal immigration offenses (Eagly, 2010).  
 Crimmigration has mainly been in response to several social, economic, and 
political changes in the past several decades. First, a large wave of immigration from the 
U.S.-Mexico border occurred in the 1980s and 1990s (Flores, 2015). Second, several 
domestic terroristic incidents transpired throughout the 1990s culminating in the 9/11 
terrorist attacks (Welch, 2003). Third, the United States has experienced a gradual 
economic decline since the 1950s, and a rising national debt has facilitated the narrative 
that nations in Asia are going to eclipse the United States as the world power (Lilly, 
Cullen, & Ball, 2015). Moreover, economic inequality vastly increased with the loss of 
manufacturing jobs due to changes in technology and two economic recessions – one in 
the early 1980s and the other in 2008 (Castells, 2010). Together, these social, economic, 
2 
 
and security issues coalesced to increase perceived economic and political threat from 
immigrants. In response, politicians and the media have blamed immigrants of color for 
terrorism and the poor economy and have turned to restrictionist policies and legislation 
as a way to address economic and security crises (Longazel, 2012; Stumpf, 2006; Welch, 
2012; Zatz & Smith, 2012). 
Against this backdrop, immigration offenders now comprise one of the largest 
categories of offenders at federal booking and sentencing (U.S Sentencing Commission, 
2016). Because of the punitive rhetoric aimed at noncitizens of color and increasing 
crimmigration, immigration scholars have voiced concerns about at unjust practices, such 
as racial and ethnic profiling in law enforcement and inequality in the administration of 
justice (Aranda & Vaquera, 2015; Garcia Hernandez, 2013; Hagan, Castro, & Rodriguez, 
2010; Johnson, 2012; Provine et al., 2016; Zatz & Rodriguez, 2015; Zatz & Smith, 2012). 
Very little empirical research, however, has examined whether immigrants of color 
receive harsher treatment in federal immigration cases. Therefore, the purpose of this 
dissertation is to provide an exhaustive empirical assessment of racial and ethnic disparity 
within immigration cases in U.S. federal courts.  
The Historical Development of Immigration Law 
Prior to 1875, immigration regulation was mainly concerned with a mix of state 
and federal affairs, such as the movement of criminals and the regulation of public health 
and slavery (Neuman, 1993). Exclusion was not a priority, and immigrants for the most 
part freely entered the United States (Cleveland, 2002; Weissbrodt, Danielson, & Myers, 
2017). The nature of immigration regulation changed in 1875 when the Supreme Court 
decided in Chy Lung v. Freeman to place the power over immigration with the federal 
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government (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2013). The Supreme Court designated 
immigration law as a matter of foreign policy and reasoned that the relationship between 
the United States and other nations should not be determined at the state level (Stumpf, 
2006). Later Supreme Court decisions would further cement the federal government’s 
authority over immigration law through the plenary power doctrine.  
The plenary power doctrine was established in a series of decisions about Chinese 
immigration beginning with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (Legomsky, 1984; 
Motomura, 1990). With the passage of this act, Congress banned Chinese laborers from 
entering the United States for a period of 10 years (Motomura, 1990). The ban was later 
contested in Chae Chan Ping v. United States on several grounds, one being that 
Congress did not have the authority to pass exclusionary laws (Motomura, 1990). 
Notably, the Constitution does not explicitly state who has authority over immigration 
law (Cleveland, 2002); however, the Supreme Court decided that Congress has the power 
to govern the inclusion and exclusion of noncitizens based on the principle of sovereignty 
(Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 1889). Sovereignty has been defined as “a recognized 
set of international rules regarding the definition and authority of a nation state and its 
interactions with other states” (Cleveland, 2002, p. 15), and limiting sovereignty is 
believed to diminish a country’s standing internationally and with other nation states 
(Cleveland, 2002). By linking immigration with the principle of sovereignty, the Supreme 
Court established the precedence of plenary power for the next 100 years and insulated 
Congress from judicial review in matters where plenary power was warranted 
(Motomura, 1990). 
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The Supreme Court continued to expand the reach of immigration law and 
plenary power in the decades following the Chinese Exclusion Case. Congress passed the 
Immigration Act of 1891 that created deportation as a procedure to expel noncitizens who 
entered without permission (Chacon, 2007). Following this act, Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States in 1893 broadened plenary power to cover the expulsion of noncitizens after entry 
(Aleinikoff, 1989), and Bugajewitz v. Adams (1913) demarcated deportation as a civil 
matter that was not to be treated as criminal punishment (Stumpf, 2007). Consequently, 
deportation was divested of the procedural safeguards afforded to criminal cases (Stumpf, 
2007). The plenary power doctrine remained securely in place throughout the beginning 
of the 20th century and was reaffirmed through a set of cases during the McCarthy Era 
(Cox, 2007; Medina, 2006).  
While the principles of civil immigration law were established, several legal 
precedents also developed that delineated how the criminal law applies to noncitizens. In 
two decisions, Yick Wo v. Hopkins in 1886 and Wong Wing v. United States in 1896, the 
Supreme Court determined that noncitizens were subject to full Constitutional protection 
for criminal offenses (Chacon, 2007). Thus, civil and criminal aspects of immigration 
were viewed as separate issues that initiate different institutional processes (Stumpf, 
2007). 
Crimmigration 
The 1980s ushered in an era where the criminal and civil divide on issues of 
immigration began to overlap in a process that has become known as “crimmigration” 
(Stumpf, 2006).  The term crimmigration refers to several spheres of change in 
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immigration law: 1) restrictionist federal policies that added civil sanctions to criminal 
offenses and that broadened immigration violations deemed criminal offenses, 2) a flurry 
of subfederal policies that attempted to regulate immigration at the local and state levels, 
and 3) the increased intersection of the criminal justice and civil immigration systems. 
Restrictionist Policies   
Criminal offenses with civil sanctions. Regarding crimes with civil sanctions, 
the first deportation policy was passed in 1917 that subjected felonies and later crimes of 
moral turpitude to deportation (Cook, 2003). In 1952, the McCarren-Walter Act, also 
known as the Immigration and Nationality Act, further shaped the structure and 
procedures of the civil immigration system, but the commission of felonies and crimes of 
moral turpitude committed within five years of entry remained the main grounds for 
deportation (Cook, 2003; Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, 2006). The first 
major expansion of criminal offenses with attached civil sanctions began with the passage 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act and Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which created 
a category of aggravated felonies (Cook, 2003; Legomsky, 2007). At first, aggravated 
felonies comprised three broad offense types: drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, and 
murder (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, 2006). Later, multiple offense 
types were added with the passages of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and Antiterrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) 
in 1996 (Cook, 2003).  
Today, the list of aggravated felonies has been further expanded, and the roster of 
civil consequences associated with aggravated felonies has expanded to include 
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ineligibility for relief from deportation, inability to apply for legal status, mandatory 
detention, lack of judicial review, and a permanent ban from the United States 
(Legomsky, 2007; Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, 2006). In addition to 
expanding aggravated felonies, the IIRIRA and AEDPA also repealed habeas corpus, 
amplified detention practices for asylum seekers, and increased the time prohibited to 
return to the United States for expired visa holders (Dobkin, 2007; Lofgren, 2005; 
Palmer, 2006).  
Immigration violations considered criminal offenses: Overall, the list of 
criminal offenses that trigger civil consequences grew substantially from 1980 to the 
present. By contrast, legislators also expanded the immigration violations considered to 
be criminal offenses. Criminalization of immigration first began in 1929 when Congress 
declared the act of unauthorized entry a misdemeanor and the act of unauthorized reentry 
a felony (Chacon, 2007; Fan, 2013; Stumpf, 2006). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
however, legislation (e.g. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Immigration 
Marriage Fraud Amendments (DATE), Immigration Act of 1990, Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, IIRIRA, and AEDPA) continued to add criminal 
sanctions to the list of immigration violations (Legomsky, 2007; Stumpf, 2006). Criminal 
immigration offenses now include the hiring of noncitizens, false documentation to avoid 
employment-related sanctions, marriage fraud, enterprises involved in evading 
immigration laws, concealing undocumented immigrants, assisting in illegal entry, 
driving above the speed limit when driving away from an immigration checkpoint, the 
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non-disclosure of assistance in fraudulent immigration documentation, false citizenship, 
and the lack of cooperation with removal orders (Legomsky, 2007).  
Subfederal Policies 
At the same time, new legislation began to blend civil and criminal statutes, and 
state and local governments across the nation issued subfederal policies regulating 
immigration, such as the well-known Proposition 187 in California in 1994 and later 
SB1070 in Arizona in 2010 (Chacon, 2012; Rodriguez, 2008). Proposition 187 banned 
undocumented immigrants from receiving social services (Calavita, 1996), and SB1070 
required local and state law enforcement to question and detain someone suspected of 
being in the United States illegally (Campbell, 2011).  Local and state policies were in 
part a frustrated reaction to the lack of federal enforcement, especially in Southwest 
border states where the population of immigrants was rapidly increasing (Provine et al., 
2016).  Although the Supreme Court struck down most subfederal policies, arguing that 
they encroached upon federal authority, Proposition 187 laid the groundwork for the 
restrictive IIRIRA and AEDA in 1996 (Chacon, 2012; Provine et al., 2016). As part of 
the 1996 legislation, the Supreme Court permitted state and local law enforcement to 
arrest previously convicted felons who were caught illegally reentering the United States, 
to arrest for civil immigration offenses if provided training, and to arrest without training 
if an influx of immigration occurred (Stumpf, 2007). A decade later, the Supreme Court 
made a further concession to local and state enforcement of criminal and civil 
immigration law by upholding the part of SB1070 that authorizes local police to question 
immigration status (Provine et al., 2016). Overall, the federal government began to share 
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its federal power over immigration enforcement with state and local law enforcement, 
which Motomura (2011) argues is where the greatest discretion and authority to enforce 
immigration law lies.  
Intersection of Criminal Justice and Civil Immigration Systems 
In a similar vein, the blurring of the criminal and civil divide also characterizes 
the practice of immigration law in the criminal justice and civil systems. Legomsky 
(2007) argues that as these two systems increasingly intersect, asymmetry characterizes 
the process where the civil system is based on a criminal justice model without the same 
procedural protections. From the criminal justice side, Eagly (2010) describes how the 
criminal justice system has not provided the full range of protections for criminal 
immigration offenses. Instead, Eagly (2010) proposes that criminal justice actors have 
taken advantage of what the civil system offers by providing a substandard level of 
justice. Moreover, she contends that the previous picture of two separate systems is 
inaccurate. More precisely, the two systems collaborate with one another in an enmeshed 
system. 
Law enforcement. At the law enforcement stage, the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
resulted in a government-initiated overhaul of immigration services that replaced the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service with the Department of Homeland Security and 
its three subdivisions: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, and U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) (Meissner, 
Kerwin, Chishti & Bergeron, 2013). Two of the branches specialize in immigration 
enforcement. ICE focuses on interior enforcement of unlawful immigration and is 
9 
 
invested with both civil and criminal enforcement powers (U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, n.d.; Wadhia, 2010), and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
oversees customs, immigration, and border security as well as agricultural protection 
(U.S. Customs and Border Protection, n.d.). The third branch, U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, is in charge of the lawful immigration process (U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services, n.d.). In the years after the founding of the Department of 
Homeland Security, ICE nearly doubled its federal court referrals, while U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection nearly tripled its federal court referrals (Meissner et al., 2013). 
Today, the Department of Homeland Security which is part of both the civil immigration 
and criminal justice systems has become the primary source of arrest and bookings into 
U.S. federal courts (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2012).  
Courts and sentencing. At the courts and sentencing stage, Eagly (2010) 
provides several examples of how the two systems have integrated. In the detention 
process, the civil and criminal justice systems in immigration cases work together in a 
way that severely restricts defendants’ freedom. For example, the criminal justice system 
is required to evaluate eligibility for bail, but the civil immigration system does not 
always guarantee a right to bond, and in some situations, the civil system calls for 
mandatory detention. Moreover, the wait period for a bond hearing is often lengthy. If the 
defendant begins in the criminal justice system, the civil system will place a retainer on 
the defendant and transfer them into immigration custody after their bail hearing. 
Therefore, defendants in criminal immigration cases are often detained in immigration 
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custody regardless of whether they are granted bail and pretrial release in the criminal 
justice system.   
The nature of bail hearings in the criminal justice system can also be different. 
Eagly (2010) describes how some district courts conduct bail hearings for groups of 
immigration offenders simultaneously rather than individually; other districts require 
thousands of dollars in cash bonds or authorize bail release while relying on immigration 
retainers to detain defendants in immigration cases, thus resulting in diminished due 
process standards. 
In the prosecution of immigration offenses, Eagly (2010) provides more examples 
of civil and criminal justice system integration. First, at case acceptance in 
nonimmigration related offenses, federal prosecutors usually screen cases and decide 
whether to bring charges against the defendant. By comparison, case acceptance in 
immigration cases is often left to the referral agency (e.g. the Department of Homeland 
Security), where it is decided whether certain cases meet the criteria for a federal offense. 
Once the referral is received, U.S. attorneys then push cases either through the magistrate 
court or through fast-track plea bargaining.  
Second and relatedly, the heavy use of magistrate court for the prosecution and 
sentencing of misdemeanor immigration (primarily illegal entry) cases and the use of 
early disposition/fast-track departure for the prosecution of felony immigration (primarily 
illegal reentry) cases has also diminished criminal due process. With respect to magistrate 
court, Eagly (2010) reports on how it was designed in 1968 to accelerate illegal entry 
cases through the criminal justice process after a wave of immigration overwhelmed the 
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federal court system. In anticipation of the establishment of the magistrate court system, 
Congress reduced illegal entry from a misdemeanor to a petty offense in the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952 to circumvent the grand jury process. Together, these two 
developments facilitated a swift process to adjudicate illegal entry cases.  
With respect to early disposition/fast-track departure, several requirements speed 
up the criminal justice process and afford fewer Constitutional protections (Eagly, 2010). 
For example, early disposition/fast-track departure requires pleading guilty within 30 
days after charges are filed, an agreement not to file any motions, and the waiving of the 
right to argue for a variance along with rights to a grand jury indictment and jury trial 
(Cole, 2012; Eagly, 2010).1 As part of the plea agreement, the prosecutor is permitted to 
add civil consequences that frequently call on the defendant to waive their civil 
immigration rights to due process (Eagly, 2010). In sum, the civil and criminal justice 
systems have intersected in a way that is detrimental to defendants in immigration cases 
and diminishes the Constitutional protections afforded in other types of federal offenses.   
Race, Ethnicity, and the Evolution of Immigration Law 
Restrictionist immigration policies and the recent crimmigration crisis can 
partially be attributed to perceived threat from a rapidly growing immigrant population 
that resulted in the construction of a “moral panic” (Welch, 2012; Zatz & Smith, 2012; 
                                                          
1 “A variance is a sentence imposed outside the applicable guideline range based upon the statutory 
sentencing factors found at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). As explained by the Ninth Circuit: ‘A “departure” is 
typically a change from the final sentencing range computed by examining the provisions of the Guidelines 
themselves. It is frequently triggered by a prosecution request to reward cooperation . . . or by other factors 
that take the case “outside the heartland” contemplated by the Sentencing Commission when it drafted the 
Guidelines for a typical offense. A “variance,” by contrast, occurs when a judge imposes a sentence above 
or below the otherwise properly calculated final sentencing range based on application of the other 
statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2016, pgs. 1-2). 
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Kubrin, Zatz, & Martinez, 2012; on moral panic see Cohen, 1972). According to the 
minority threat perspective, as a minority population grows in size, the majority perceives 
a threat to their economic resources and political power (Blalock, 1967). In response to 
perceived threats, the majority group mobilizes their resources to keep their position of 
privilege (Blalock, 1967), and constructing a moral panic is one means to justify their 
authority and legitimize the mobilization of resources (Longazel, 2012; Welch, 2012). 
More recently, minority threat scholars have recognized that perceived criminal threat is 
also a source of fear because historical stereotypes and media portrayals have associated 
immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities with crime (Crawford, Chiricos, & Kleck, 
1998). As Zatz and Smith (2012) note, moral panic enables politicians to evoke fear and 
anxiety over immigrants of color and racial and ethnic minorities without explicitly 
appealing to racist sentiments.  
Throughout history, perceived threat and moral panics have shaped and continue 
to shape immigration law and policy to the detriment of immigrants of color. Indeed, 
perceived threat and moral panic were driving forces behind the construction of plenary 
power in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (Zatz & Smith, 2012). The Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882 emerged in the context of an economic recession after the Pacific 
Railroad was completed (Calavita, 2000). A number of Chinese laborers had entered the 
United States to work on the railroad, and in the wake of a recession, public sentiment 
turned hostile and blamed Chinese laborers for the lack of jobs (Calavita, 2000).  
After the construction of plenary power, immigration law became more 
vulnerable to reactionary policies because of the lack of checks and balances from the 
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judiciary (Legomsky, 1984). Consequently, sweeping social changes (e.g. 
industrialization, World War I, and a wave of immigration) in the early twentieth century 
sparked the quota system mandated by Congress in 1924 (Weissbrodt, et al., 2017). The 
quota system restricted immigration from certain nations and excluded immigrants of 
color from citizenship (Ngai, 1999). Essentially, it was a source of control over the racial 
and ethnic makeup of the United States during a time when the nation was becoming 
more diverse (Ngai, 1999). Correspondingly, Congress criminalized illegal entry and 
reentry as a means to enforce the quota system (Chacon, 2007).  
Another example of how perceived threat and moral panics led to new 
immigration legislation is the Alien Registration Act of 1940, which targeted former 
Communist Party members for deportation during the McCarthy Era (Johnson, 1997; 
Welch, 2003). Similarly, Haitian refugees received exceptionally severe treatment when a 
military coup forced thousands of them to seek asylum in the United States (Johnson, 
1998). To stop the incoming stream of immigrants of color, the Bush Administration 
ordered interdiction, mandatory detention, and repatriation upon arrival (Johnson, 1998).  
More recently, a flow of Hispanic immigrants into the southwest coincided with 
domestic terrorist incidents that led to the harsh restrictionist legislation in the 1980s and 
1990s (e.g. IIRIRA and AEDPA) (Vasquez, 2015). Subsequently, the media and 
government officials blamed the 9/11 terrorist attacks on recent immigration and created 
the Department of Homeland Security (Johnson, 1997; Welch, 2003). Mexican 
immigrants have especially been demonized (Medina, 2006; Zatz & Smith, 2012). While 
Mexican immigrants have a lengthy history of oppression and discrimination in the 
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United States, especially since World War II (Kanstroom, 2007; Portes & Rumbaut, 
2006), recent security crises have clouded the lines between crime, terror, and 
immigration to amplify fear of Mexican immigrants (Chacon, 2007; Medina, 2006; 
Provine & Doty, 2011). In fact, Welch (2012) further contends that the pervasive rhetoric 
evoking fear along with the extreme measures to combat immigration and terror in the 
past three decades has elevated the United States beyond moral panic to what he calls a 
“risk society.” He asserts that moral panics eventually subside, but risk societies are 
marked by enduring social and legal changes and transformation of mechanisms of 
control. He observes that immigration law has been used to dismantle Constitutional 
protections, essentially altering the criminal justice system.  
Consequences of Crimmigration 
 The move toward crimmigration has resulted in numerous consequences. One 
consequence has been the separation of immigrant families and their children (Zatz & 
Rodriguez, 2015). The U.S. Sentencing Commission (2015) recently issued a report 
describing the characteristics of illegal reentry offenders, finding that 67% had relatives 
and 49% had children in the United States. In fact, a greater portion of illegal reentry 
offenders had children located in the United States than in their country of origin. 
Additionally, approximately 50% spoke English, and more than 50% had initially entered 
the United States before the age of 17 (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2015). With 
heightened enforcement and deportation of criminal immigration offenders, 
undocumented parents and their children have been increasingly separated (Zatz & 
Rodriguez, 2015). In the aftermath of separation, some children have been placed in 
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foster care, and their families have experienced economic and emotional distress (Hagan, 
Castro, & Rodriguez, 2010; Zatz & Rodriguez, 2015). Furthermore, deportation of 
undocumented immigrants has negatively affected the communities in which they live by 
inducing fear and decreasing business and use of services (Hagan, Castro, & Rodriguez, 
2010).  
A second consequence of crimmigration has been increased punishment for and 
expenditures on non-violent crimes and civil offenses. Restrictionist policies and the 
intersection of the civil and criminal systems have resulted in a draconian process of 
punishment for immigration offenders who are mostly filtered into the federal court 
process for non-violent crimes. As a result, defendants in immigration cases are detained 
and sentenced at high rates and are confined for lengthy periods of time (Eagly, 2010). 
For example, immigration offenders remain confined in immigration custody for an 
average of 30 days (Schiriro, 2009), and between the years 2004 and 2012, immigration 
offenders received an average sentence length of a year and eight months (U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, 2012). In addition, expanded infrastructure and enforcement of 
civil immigration offenses and crimes has increased federal expenditures. The federal 
government on average spends $18 billion per year on immigration enforcement, and ICE 
is the largest law enforcement agency at the federal level (Meissner, et al., 2013). 
Relatedly, a third consequence is the encroachment on civil liberties. Vast 
discretion characterizes immigration enforcement (Motomura, 2011), and a body of 
literature has documented how decision making in both the civil and criminal justice 
systems is racially and ethnically biased against immigrants of color in the forms of 
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police stops and workforce and home raids (Aranda & Vaquera, 2015; Garcia Hernandez, 
2013; Hagan, Castro, & Rodriguez, 2010; Johnson, 2012; Provine et al., 2016; Zatz & 
Rodriguez, 2015). Inequality in the application of law raises issues of civil liberties, as 
due process prohibits discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or national origin (see Civil 
Rights Act, 1964).  
Immigration Cases and the Federal Court System 
The criminalization and intensified enforcement of immigration has drastically 
increased the number of immigration cases entering the federal court system. In 2012, 
immigration offenses comprised 49.6% of federal arrests and bookings and 34% of 
federal court sentencing cases (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2012). Even though 
immigration offenses form one of the largest categories of offenses in federal courts, very 
few studies have examined immigration cases empirically since most studies in the courts 
and sentencing literature have removed immigration cases from analysis (see Light, 2014; 
Ulmer, Eisentsten & Johnson, 2009; Ulmer, Light, & Kramer, 2011a, 2011b). This 
oversight is due in part to the many unique aspects that differentiate immigration cases 
from other federal offense types, such as the overlap with the civil system, the use of 
early disposition or fast-track departures, the demographic background of the defendants, 
and the reliance on detention and incarceration (Demuth, 2002; Doerner & Demuth, 
2014; Motomura, 2011; Maxfield & Burchfield, 2002; McClellan & Sands, 2006).  
Knowing the legal and extra-legal factors that influence court outcomes for 
immigration offenses, however, is critical to shed light on any problematic practices, such 
as inequality in the administration of justice. Given that immigration policy has often 
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been developed from anti-immigrant attitudes and moral panics, legal scholars have 
documented their concerns with racial bias and discriminatory practices as the number of 
immigration offenders processed through the criminal justice system increases (Arnold, 
2007; Wishnie, 2004). Findings from the few studies that have examined immigration 
cases at sentencing further this concern. For example, Hartley and Tillyer (2012) found 
that black and Hispanic defendants, in comparison to white defendants, receive longer 
sentences; however, in some federal districts Hispanic defendants received shorter 
sentence lengths. 
Unwarranted disparity in the court processing of immigration cases places undue 
burden on defendants who are on the receiving end of harsher punishment. Considering 
the context of crimmigration, immigration offenders who are processed through the 
criminal justice system may be assigned an extended period of confinement, mandatory 
deportation, ineligibility to obtain a green card in the future, and a lengthy exclusionary 
period from reentering the country (Motomura, 2011). These sanctions are exceedingly 
harsh for defendants who have already established work and family ties in the United 
States and for those who have immigrated from extremely disadvantaged circumstances 
(Bosworth & Kaufman, 2011; Chacon, 2007; Stumpf, 2006; see also Zatz & Rodriguez, 
2014, 2015). Moreover, Yick Wo v. Hopkins and Wong Wing v. United States have long 
established that noncitizens and immigrants of color possess full Constitutional rights 
when exposed to the criminal justice system. Accordingly, any unwarranted disparity in 
the case processing or court outcomes of immigration cases also encroaches upon civil 
rights and undermines the legitimacy of the justice system.  
18 
 
Present Study 
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive study of 
immigration cases in U.S. federal district courts with a focus on whether racial and ethnic 
disparity exists within the federal court processing of immigration cases. To do so, the 
present study draws on the focal concerns and minority threat perspectives. This 
dissertation has three objectives: to assess cumulative disadvantage within immigration 
cases, to assess contextual disparity within immigration cases, and to assess racial and 
ethnic disparity within immigration cases over time.  
Data 
The data for this dissertation come from the Federal Justice Statistics Program 
(FJSP) data series (1994-2012) that were obtained from the Inter-university Consortium 
for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). The FJSP is a data-linking system funded by 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics and designed by the Urban Institute that enables 
defendants to be followed across multiple federal agencies. The Urban Institute recently 
updated their linking approach by employing Jaro-Winkler algorithms that use a 
defendant’s identifying information to find a match between agencies. Once matched, the 
unique case identifiers from each agency are paired together as a dyad in a crosswalk file 
that allows the sequential merging of data (see Kelly, 2012). Given the purpose of 
examining the federal court processing of immigration cases, the main agencies of 
interest for the present study are the United States Marshalls Service (USMS), the 
Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA), the Administrative Office of the 
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U.S. Courts (AOUSC), and the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC). Figure 1 
presents the linking order of the agency data.  
At the earliest stage, the USMS is considered the law enforcement component of 
the federal criminal justice system and contains information regarding basic 
demographics, offense type, and arrest agency on suspects arrested and booked in U.S. 
Federal Courts. Following the USMS, the EOUSA documents criminal matters concluded 
and cases terminated by U.S. Magistrates and U.S. Attorneys. In addition, the EOUSA 
contains information on whether a case was declined for prosecution or was filed in 
district or magistrate court. The AOUSC also records criminal cases terminated by U.S. 
Attorneys. In addition, the AOUSC collects data on charging decisions, such as the most 
severe filing charge and the most severe terminating charge. Accordingly, the EOUSA is 
used to examine filing decisions, while the AOUSC is used to look at charging decisions. 
Lastly, the USSC holds a wealth of background information on defendants as well as the 
sentence received, mode of conviction, and whether the defendant was detained prior to 
sentencing. The richness of the data and the availability of immigration cases across 
multiple agencies and decision points make the FJSP ideal for this dissertation. In 
addition, data are also pulled from the U.S. Census and other sources and combined with 
the FJSP for district-level analysis.  
Figure 1: Flow of agency-linked data sets  
 
USMS EOUSA AOUSC USSC
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Organization 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized into four chapters. Chapter Two 
investigates cumulative disadvantage within the processing of immigration cases. The 
chapter draws on the focal concerns perspective to examine if white Hispanic, black non-
Hispanic, black Hispanic, and Asian defendants are treated more harshly than white non-
Hispanic defendants at multiple stages throughout the court processing of immigration 
offenses. Outcomes include case filing, presentence detention, early disposition, charge 
reduction, guideline departure, and sentencing.  
Chapter Three investigates whether district-level context has an impact on 
multiple decision points and whether the effects of ethnicity are contextualized according 
to district. Specifically, the minority threat perspective provides a framework to assess if 
percent foreign-born and percent Hispanic facilitate harsher treatment of defendants at 
case filing, presentence detention, early disposition, charge reduction, guideline 
departure, and sentence length. The influence of absolute changes in threat are also 
examined for these six outcomes. Lastly, cross-level interactions are conducted to see 
whether Hispanic defendants are treated more severely in districts with a larger Hispanic 
or foreign-born population and with a greater absolute change in percent Hispanic and 
percent foreign-born.  
Chapter Four assesses ethnic disparity over time and builds on Chapter Three by 
examining whether Hispanic defendants receive more severe sentences over time in 
districts with an absolute change in the Hispanic population size. Chapter Five concludes 
the dissertation with a comprehensive discussion and final remarks. The chapter begins 
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with a summary of findings from Chapters Two, Three, and Four, then proceeds to 
theoretical and policy implications. Chapter Five also addresses limitations, future 
directions, and ends with a final conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2: CUMULATIVE DISADVANTAGE WITHIN IMMIGRATION 
OFFENSES 
Overview 
  Fueled in part by the implementation of state-level determinate sentencing and 
federal sentencing guidelines that were created to make punishment a fairer and more 
uniform process (Stith & Cabranes, 1998), a large body of literature has accumulated on 
racial and ethnic disparity in sentencing decisions (see Baumer, 2013; Mitchell, 2005; 
Pratt, 1998; Spohn, 2000; Ulmer, 2012; Zatz, 2000). Because the effects of race and 
ethnicity have become more implicit over time and are often dependent upon other 
factors, the most recent wave of research has examined the various contexts, decision 
points, and offense types under which racial and ethnic disparity emerges (Baumer, 2013; 
Mitchell, 2005; Ulmer, 2012).  
Compared to the literature on other federal offenses, such as violent, drug, and 
weapon crimes (see Albonetti, 1997, 2002; Cassidy, 2009; Farrell, 2003; Froyd, 1999; 
Hartley, 2008; Hartley et al., 2007; Hartley & Miller, 2010; Hofer, 2000; Kautt, 2002; 
Kautt & Spohn, 2002; Mustard, 2001), immigration cases have been understudied and 
commonly removed from courts and sentencing research. The lack of research on 
immigration offenses is largely due to the empirical difficulties that immigration cases 
present because of fast-track departures, demographic uniformity, and differences in 
case-processing (Hartley & Tillyer, 2012).  
Despite the empirical challenges, neglecting immigration cases is problematic for 
at least three reasons. First, recent legislation, enhanced enforcement, and the moral panic 
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surrounding criminal immigration have led to an influx of immigration cases in the 
federal court system in the past two decades (Stumpf, 2006; U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, 2012). Second, immigration cases may be particularly vulnerable to 
unequal treatment because criminal immigration has become highly politicized, and the 
term “criminal illegal alien” has become associated with immigrants of color (Johnson, 
1996). Third and relatedly, the interconnection with the civil system has further enabled 
unequal treatment within immigration cases by diminishing the Constitutional protections 
of defendants (Eagly, 2010).  
Against this backdrop, the purpose of the present study is to provide a 
comprehensive examination of racial and ethnic disparity in federal immigration cases. 
Drawing on the focal concerns perspective and using a cumulative disadvantage 
approach, a series of hypotheses are developed to test whether black Hispanic, black non-
Hispanic, white Hispanic, and Asian defendants receive harsher treatment than non-
Hispanic whites over six federal decision points. The Federal Justice Statistics Program 
(FJSP) data series is used to conduct analysis. Findings are discussed as well as 
implications for theory, research, policy, and practice.  
Judicial and Prosecutorial Discretion 
The 1980s and 1990s ushered in an era of sentencing reform that had a profound 
impact on the courts and sentencing process. Until that point, indeterminate sentencing 
stood at the heart of the criminal justice process and provided judges with flexibility in 
imposing sentences (Cullen & Gilbert, 2013; Stith & Koh, 1993). In the years leading up 
to sentencing reform, the indeterminate sentence came under attack by conservatives and 
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liberals alike but for very different reasons. Liberals were concerned with abuse of the 
indeterminate sentence, claiming that judicial discretion led to unwarranted disparity 
(Stith & Koh, 1993; Tonry, 1996; Walker, 1998). Conservatives, on the other hand, had 
always been critical of indeterminate sentencing, claiming that it facilitated judicial 
leniency (Beckett & Sasson, 2000; Stith & Koh, 1993; Tonry, 1996). Criticisms of 
indeterminate sentencing eventually led to the bipartisan creation of the federal 
sentencing guidelines implemented in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Tonry, 1996).  
The main objective behind the creation and implementation of the sentencing 
guidelines was to reduce unwarranted disparity and to make the process of assigning 
punishment equal and uniform (Nagel & Schulhofer, 1992; Stith & Cabranes, 1998). 
Therefore, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created sentencing guidelines based on 
real offense behavior, such as offense seriousness and relevant conduct (Stith & 
Cabranes, 1998). In practice, the sentencing guidelines contain 43 base-level offense 
categories that adjust for criminal history and conduct (Stith & Cabranes, 1998; U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, 2016). Beginning in the 21st century, however, the U.S. 
Supreme Court in a series of decisions made the guidelines advisory and introduced 
discretion back into the sentencing process (Hofer, 2007; Ulmer, et al.; 2011a; 2011b; 
Kim, Cano, Kim, & Spohn, 2016).  
The exceptional focus on judicial discretion as a source of unwarranted disparity, 
however, ignored discretion practiced at other points in the criminal justice process. As 
many scholars have argued, the sentencing guidelines simply displaced discretion and the 
possibility of unwarranted disparity to legislators and other courtroom actors – formally 
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termed “hydraulic displacement” (Miethe, 1987; Savelsburg, 1992; Zatz, 1984, 1987). A 
legislative example of this is the crack-cocaine sentencing policy adopted by Congress in 
the 1980s that built unwarranted disparity into the sentencing guidelines (Engen, 2011; 
U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2007). For example, a sale of crack-cocaine resulted in a 
sentence length 100 times greater than a sale for an equal amount of powder cocaine 
when crack- and powder cocaine are essentially the same drug but in different forms 
(King & Maure, 2006). The primary difference between the two drugs is that crack-
cocaine has been associated with the African American community while powder cocaine 
has been associated with the white community (King & Mauer, 2006).  
More frequently, “hydraulic displacement” refers to the unfettered discretion held 
by prosecutors whose decisions are largely hidden from the public view (Albonetti, 1987; 
Hartley, Maddan, & Spohn, 2007; Shermer & Johnson, 2010; Spohn & Fornango, 2009). 
Federal prosecutors play an important role in federal case processing and sentencing. 
They have the authority to decide whether to accept or decline a case, what charges to 
bring against a defendant, and whether to dismiss charges (Kim, Spohn, & Hedberg, 
2015; Shermer & Johnson, 2010; Piehl & Bushway, 2007). Prosecutors can also decide 
whether to file a motion for a substantial assistance departure and whether to negotiate 
plea offers (Hartley, et al., 2007; Kim, et al., 2015; Spohn & Fornango, 2009; Ulmer, 
Eisenstein, & Johnson, 2009). Therefore, their decisions can significantly shape the final 
outcome of a case regardless of whether judicial discretion is constrained.  
One courtroom actor that has received less attention than either federal 
prosecutors or district judges is the federal magistrate judge. Like U.S. attorneys, federal 
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magistrate decisions are hidden from public view, and federal magistrates are only held 
accountable by the federal district judge, who has the authority to reverse any decisions 
made by the magistrate judge (McCabe, 2014). Federal magistrate judges have four main 
duties. They can 1) decide petty and misdemeanor offenses; 2) preside over pretrial 
matters and detention decisions; 3) perform initial proceedings in criminal cases; and 4) 
determine civil cases if agreed on by those involved in the case (McCabe, 2014). 
Importantly, initial proceedings and detention decisions have been shown to significantly 
influence subsequent court outcomes (Sacks & Ackerman, 2014; Spohn, 2009; Williams, 
2003).   
Because case processing and sentencing is a collaborative and dynamic process 
composed of multiple actors, sentencing scholars have advocated for a cumulative 
disadvantage approach to sentencing research (Baumer, 2013; Brennan, 2006; LaFree, 
1985; Lizotte, 1978; Spohn, 2009; Spohn, Gruhl, & Welch, 1981-1982; Zatz, 1985). The 
cumulative disadvantage approach is a paradigm that considers the whole court process 
and recognizes that examining different stages of the justice system separately cannot 
provide a complete picture of the many complex and subtle ways different parts of the 
process integrate and affect one other (Baumer, 2013; Hagan, 1974; Ulmer, 2012; Spohn, 
2015a; Zatz, 1987, 2000). Typically, cumulative disadvantage is applied to sentencing 
research by examining each stage of the court process. Subsequently, the influence of 
prior stages on later court outcomes is investigated as well as the general effect of the key 
variable of interest on combined court outcomes (see Kutateladze et al., 2014; Sutton, 
2013; Wooldredge et al., 2015). The cumulative disadvantage approach overcomes 
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limitations in investigating a single decision point because it accounts for subtle, indirect, 
and cumulative effects within the criminal justice system.  
Immigration Cases in the Federal Court System 
 Parallel to sentencing reform, Congress passed legislation that broadened the 
categories of criminal immigration offenses (Zatz & Rodriguez, 2015). In addition, the 
U.S. government expanded its capacity to enforce immigration cases by creating the 
Department of Homeland Security and its subsector Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) in 2002 (Wadhia, 2010). Accordingly, expenditures on immigration 
enforcement increased substantially to the point where ICE now comprises the largest 
enforcement mechanism of the U.S. federal government (Meissner et al., 2013). As a 
result, the number of immigration cases prosecuted in U.S. federal courts increased 
exponentially and now comprise the largest primary offense category (Beckett & Evans, 
2015; Hagan, Rodriguez, & Castro, 2011; Stumpf, 2013).  
Immigration offenses differ from other federal offense types in a number of ways 
because of their interdependency with the civil system. First, as previously discussed, the 
intersection of the criminal and civil courts has resulted in the differential prosecution of 
immigration cases compared to other offense types. For example, civil actors are 
involved in the screening and referral of immigration cases compared to that of other 
offense types, where U.S. attorneys oversee screening, declination, and filing (Eagly, 
2010). In this study, case declinations represent less than .01% of immigration cases, 
whereas case declinations comprise 4% of other federal offense types. Relatedly, nearly 
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60% of immigration cases are filed in magistrate court. By comparison, 10% of 
nonimmigration cases are filed in magistrate court.  
Additionally, early disposition typically only applies to illegal reentry cases; early 
disposition is essentially a type of plea bargain that speeds up the federal court process 
and deportation and results in a fast-track departure that reduces the length of sentence 
served. Early disposition occurs in approximately 25% of immigration cases filed in 
district court (Maxfield & Burchfield, 2002; McClellan & Sands, 2006; see descriptive 
statistics below). By contrast, early disposition and fast-track departures are only granted 
in 3% of nonimmigration cases filed in district court. Because fast-track departures 
prevent defendants from receiving other types of departures, federal prosecutors hold 
more discretion over the departure decision in immigration cases compared to other 
offense types. 
Second, immigration cases differ from other offense types, especially other 
nonviolent offense types, in the ubiquity of detention and incarceration (Chin, 2011). In 
this study, 98% of immigration defendants are held in presentence detention, while 68% 
of defendants in other offense types are held in presentence detention. Similarly, 93% of 
immigration cases filed in district court result in incarceration, whereas 44% of all other 
offense types filed in district court lead to incarceration. Third, the primary demographic 
of immigration cases consists of Hispanic noncitizens (Hartley & Tillyer, 2012). 
Noncitizens comprise 20% of defendants in nonimmigration offenses but are 97% of 
defendants in immigration offenses.  
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Overall, due to their qualitatively distinct nature, immigration cases have received 
little empirical attention (Hartley & Tillyer, 2012). Nevertheless, the discretion afforded 
to prosecutors in immigration cases and the continued growth of immigration cases in 
U.S. Federal Courts call for an empirical understanding of how these cases are processed 
and whether race and ethnicity impact decision making.  
Theoretical Framework 
Focal Concerns. The focal concerns perspective connects the use of discretion to 
unwarranted racial and ethnic disparity in decision making and explains how and why 
race and ethnicity influence court outcomes. According to this perspective, criminal 
justice actors depend on three focal concerns to arrive at decisions (Steffensmeier, Ulmer, 
& Kramer, 1998). These encompass the blameworthiness of the defendant, protection of 
the community, and practical constraints on and consequences of decisions 
(Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998). Courtroom actors, however, are limited in their 
decision making by time constraints and available information leading to “bounded 
rationality” (Albonetti, 1987). Because decision makers often have limited time and 
information to process all aspects of the case, they may rely on extralegal characteristics 
to determine defendants’ culpability and future dangerousness to the community, 
especially when race, gender, age, and case characteristics interact to provoke negative 
stereotypes (Albonetti, 1991; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998). Due to the United 
States’ lengthy history of using the criminal justice system as a tool of racial oppression 
and control, young, black males have been singled out as dangerous and criminally prone, 
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and media portrayals of crime continue to perpetuate stereotypes of black male offenders 
(Russell-Brown, 2009).  
In the context of immigration offenses, other racial/ethnic groups have been the 
recipients of stereotyping. In particular, the Latino population has been associated with 
undocumented immigration, drug trafficking, and criminality (Chavez, 2013; Roman, 
2000; Russell-Brown, 2009). Several scholars have noted that in the public’s mind, the 
term criminal illegal alien is synonymous with Hispanic ethnicity, and with Mexican 
migrants especially (Fan, 2013; Chacon, 2007; Zatz & Smith, 2012). Similarly, Wu and 
Kim (2012) have also documented how an increase in Asian immigration during the 20th 
century facilitated a stereotype of Asian immigrants as smugglers and visa overstayers. 
This negative stereotype of Asian immigrants has operated simultaneously with the 
image of the “model minority” to the detriment of Asian defendants charged with 
immigration offenses. Consistent with this observation, Wu and Kim (2012) found no 
evidence of preferential treatment for Asian defendants within immigration offenses. 
Black immigrants, immigrating mostly from Haiti, Jamaica, and continental 
Africa (Bryce-Laport, 1972; Palmer, 2017), are fewer in number than Hispanic 
immigrants and have received less attention in the immigration literature. In fact, Palmer 
(2017) argues that black immigrants have been erased from the conversation and their 
plight has been invisible. Nevertheless, they are overrepresented in the criminal justice 
system (Palmer, 2017). Calavita (2007) asserts that Americans do not cognitively 
separate black immigrants from African Americans, thus the historical oppression of 
African Americans is transferred onto black immigrants (see also Waters, 1994). 
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Consequently, black immigrants are similarly viewed as dangerous and criminally prone 
(Calavita, 2007). 
Steffensmeier and Demuth (2000) demonstrated the importance of taking a more 
nuanced approach toward race and ethnicity by arguing that the perceived distinctiveness 
of racial and ethnic minority status may combine to the disadvantage of black Hispanic 
defendants. Courtroom actors may perceive black Hispanic defendants as more 
dangerous and blameworthy because their minority status is amplified not only by race 
but also by the linguistic and cultural differences associated with ethnicity. The authors’ 
findings supported their claims. In relating Steffensmeier and Demuth (2000)’s findings 
to defendants in immigration offenses, however, the distinction by race and ethnicity may 
be less pronounced because immigration offenses are disproportionately committed by 
noncitizens and cultural and linguistic differences characterize all racial and ethnic 
groups. Therefore, whether race and ethnicity within immigration cases combine to the 
disadvantage of black Hispanic noncitizens remains an empirical question. 
Review of the Literature 
Courts and sentencing research has focused on how race and ethnicity influence 
sentencing and whether policy changes that made the guidelines advisory reintroduced 
unwarranted disparity in the sentencing process (see Baumer, 2013; Spohn, 2000; Ulmer, 
2012; Zatz, 2000 for an overview). Generally, studies have found that racial and ethnic 
disparity in sentencing has become less overt over time (Spohn, 2000, 2015b; Zatz, 1987, 
2000). Instead, the relationship between offender race/ethnicity and sentencing is often 
dependent on other factors, such as, the offender’s gender, age, and employment status, 
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victim characteristics, environmental context, or prior decision points (Baumer, 2013; 
Mitchell, 2005; Pratt, 1998; Spohn, 2000, 2015b; Ulmer, 2012; Zatz, 2000). Despite the 
decrease in explicit discrimination, Van Cleve (2016) demonstrates that implicit bias is 
no less insidious. Literature has also found that racial and ethnic disparity in sentencing 
decisions has remained relatively stable in the wake of Booker/ Fanfan v. United States 
and Gall v. United States (Fischman & Schanzenback, 2012; Starr & Rehavi, 2013; Kim 
et al., 2016; Ulmer et al., 2011a, 2011b).  
Because prior decision points often shape later decisions and U.S. attorneys are 
afforded great discretion in case acceptance, charging, and plea bargaining, a body of 
literature began to examine the influence of race and ethnicity in prosecutorial decision 
making (Albonetti, 1986, 1987; Albonetti & Hepburn, 1996; Spears & Spohn, 1997; 
Spohn & Spears, 1996; Ulmer, Kurlychek, & Kramer, 2007; Wright & Engen, 2006). The 
findings have been mixed in federal court research. Some studies show racial and ethnic 
disparity in case acceptance or dismissal, plea bargaining, charging decisions, and 
substantial assistance departures (e.g. Hartley et al., 2007; Kutateladze, Andiloro, & 
Johnson, 2016; Starr & Rehavi, 2014; Ulmer et al., 2011b); other studies do not (e.g. 
Franklin, 2010; Shermer & Johnson, 2010). By comparison to studies on prosecutorial 
discretion, only a few studies have looked at pretrial and presentence detention decisions. 
The few studies on detention decisions have consistently found that black and Hispanic 
defendants are more likely to be detained compared to white non-Hispanic defendants 
(Demuth, 2003; Lizotte, 1978; Schlesinger, 2005; Ulmer, Painter-Davis, & Tinik, 2016; 
but see Reitler et al., 2013).  
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A smaller number of studies have used a cumulative disadvantage approach to 
detect how racial and ethnic disparity accumulates over multiple decision points. Recent 
studies that have used a more comprehensive and dynamic method by assessing 
cumulative disadvantage have garnered support for this approach. For example, Spohn 
(2009) found that race directly impacted pretrial detention. In turn, pretrial detention 
significantly increased sentence length for black, male offenders. Therefore, race 
indirectly influenced sentence length through pretrial detention and had a cumulative 
effect. Similarly, Stolzenberg, D’Alessio, and Eitle (2013) found that race significantly 
affected sentence length and the decision to incarcerate in addition to having an overall 
cumulative effect. Kutateladze et al. (2014) also found evidence for cumulative 
disadvantage and strengthened prior findings by uncovering racial and ethnic disparities 
at some decision points (pretrial detention, plea offers, and incarceration). Wooldredge et 
al. (2015) found particularistic rather than systematic race effects on court outcomes 
(bond amounts, pretrial detention, and nonsuspended prison sentences) and an overall 
significant cumulative effect.  
Notably, only two studies have examined racial and ethnic disparity within 
immigration cases. Hartley and Tillyer (2012) found that sentence length varied by race 
and ethnicity in immigration offenses, where black and Hispanic defendants were more 
likely to receive a lengthier sentence compared to white defendants. In some federal 
districts, however, Hispanic defendants received shorter sentence lengths. By contrast, 
Tillyer and Hartley (2016) examined the use of fast-track departures and found no 
differences based on race and ethnicity. Together, the two studies found that racial and 
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ethnic disparity within immigration cases depends on the decision point, which further 
supports the need for a more comprehensive approach. In sum, the application of the 
cumulative disadvantage approach to immigration cases can help inform future 
immigration research, policy, and practice on relevant predictors for multiple court 
outcomes and can identify the location and mechanisms of any unwarranted disparity. 
Hypotheses 
The purpose of the present study is to conduct a comprehensive examination of 
racial and ethnic disparity in immigration cases to identify the location and mechanisms 
of any unwarranted disparity. Drawing on the focal concerns perspective and using a 
cumulative disadvantage approach, the following hypotheses are derived.  
Hypothesis 1: Black defendants and Asian defendants will be more likely to have their 
cases filed in district court compared to their white counterparts.2  
Hypothesis 2: Black non-Hispanic, black Hispanic, white Hispanic, and Asian 
defendants will experience harsher treatment within immigration cases at each stage 
of the federal court process compared to their white non-Hispanic counterparts. 
Hypothesis 2a: Black Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, white Hispanic, and 
Asian defendants will be more likely to be detained prior to sentencing. 
Hypothesis 2b: Black Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, white Hispanic, and 
                                                          
2 Black non-Hispanic and black Hispanic defendants are combined to represent black defendants at case 
filing because ethnicity is not available in the USMS. Similarly, white non-Hispanics and white Hispanics 
are also combined to represent white defendants for the same reason.  
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Asian defendants will be less likely to receive early disposition than white non-
Hispanic defendants.3  
Hypothesis 2c: Black Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, white Hispanic, and 
Asian defendants will be less likely to receive a charge reduction than white non-
Hispanic defendants. 
Hypothesis 2d: Black Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, white Hispanic, and 
Asian defendants will be less likely to receive a guideline departure (i.e. downward, 
substantial assistance, and other government assistance) than white non-Hispanic 
defendants. 
Hypothesis 2e: Black Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, white Hispanic, and 
Asian defendants will be more likely to receive a lengthier sentence than white non-
Hispanic defendants.  
Hypothesis 3: Black Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, white Hispanic, and Asian 
defendants will receive harsher treatment indirectly through the influence of prior 
stages on later stages.  
Hypothesis 3a: Black Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, white Hispanic, and 
Asian defendants will be more likely to receive presentence detention and that will in 
turn, decrease the likelihood of an early disposition.  
Hypothesis 3b: Black Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, white Hispanic, and Asian 
                                                          
3 Early disposition results in a shorter sentence length, yet it is also an avenue for deportation and has been 
associated with crimmigration. On the one hand, defendants of color may be less likely to receive early 
disposition because of the leniency in sentence length. On the other hand, they may be more likely to 
receive early disposition because of deportation.  
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defendants will be more likely to receive presentence detention and less likely to 
receive early disposition and that will, in turn, indirectly decrease the likelihood of a 
charge reduction.4  
Hypothesis 3c: Black Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, white Hispanic, and Asian 
defendants will have an increased likelihood of presentence detention and a 
decreased likelihood of charge reduction and that will, in turn, decrease the 
likelihood of a guideline departure.  
Hypothesis 3d: Black Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, white Hispanic, and Asian 
defendants will have an increased likelihood of presentence detention and a reduced 
likelihood of early disposition, charge reduction, and guideline departure and those 
will, in turn, increase sentence length.   
Hypothesis 4: The effects of race and ethnicity combined over multiple decision points – 
presentence detention, early disposition, charge reduction, guideline departure, and 
sentence length – will accumulate to the detriment of black non-Hispanic, black 
Hispanic, white Hispanic and Asian defendants. 
Hypothesis 4a: The total effect of race and ethnicity will decrease the likelihood of early 
disposition for black Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, white Hispanic, and Asian 
defendants.  
Hypothesis 4b: The total effect of race and ethnicity will decrease the likelihood of a 
                                                          
4 Prior research has shown that detention decisions have resulted in more punitive treatment of defendants 
in subsequent outcomes. Although this relationship has more often been examined on sentencing decisions, 
prosecutors may also view detention status as an indicator that the defendant poses a greater threat than 
those who are released and may be less likely to reduce the charges. 
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charge reduction for black Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, white Hispanic, and Asian 
defendants.  
Hypothesis 4c: The total effect of race and ethnicity will decrease the likelihood of a 
guideline departure for black Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, white Hispanic, and 
Asian defendants.  
Hypothesis 4d: The total effect of race and ethnicity will increase sentence length 
for black Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, white Hispanic, and Asian defendants.  
Data and Methods 
Data 
To test the above hypotheses, the Federal Justice Statistics Program (FJSP) data 
series is used. This contains data across various federal agencies, such as the U.S. 
Marshals Service (USMS), the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA), the 
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (AOUSC), and the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
(USSC). The FJSP is ideal for studying cumulative disadvantage within immigration 
offenses because it follows defendants throughout the court process, including early 
decision points. Moreover, weaknesses inherent in a single data set can be overcome 
through merging data across agencies. For example, the EOUSA and AOUSC have 
important prosecutorial decision points and court processing information, but neither has 
defendant background and demographic information. The USMS and USSC contain 
demographic and background information on defendants. Therefore, merging together the 
USMS, EOUSA, AOUSC, and USSC facilitates the examination of racial and ethnic 
disadvantage over multiple decision points (see Johnson, 2012). Relatedly, the FJSP is 
the only data set to include case processing information on immigration cases. 
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The USMS, EOUSA, AOUSC, and USSC are merged for a cohort of defendants 
drawn from the USMS who were arrested in the years 2004 through 2010. The years 
2004 through 2010 were chosen for two reasons. First, the cohort of arrested defendants 
begins in 2004 because early disposition was not uniformly tracked until the PROTECT 
Act was passed in April of 2003. Second, the cohort of defendants ends in 2010 because 
this ensures that all the defendants have completed the court process through sentencing. 
For example, the full federal court process often takes a year or two to complete where 
defendants arrested in 2010 are sentenced in 2011 or 2012. If the years 2011 or 2012 are 
included in the cohort of arrested defendants, a large portion will drop out of the sample 
because they have not yet been charged or sentenced.5  
After the data are merged, defendants whose primary offense at arrest is an 
immigration offense are selected from the full sample. Immigration offenses in the 
USMS consist of illegal entry/illegal reentry, smuggling of aliens, false citizenship, and 
other immigration offenses comprised mostly of visa and marriage fraud and other types 
of fraudulent documentation. In addition, American Indian defendants and citizens are 
removed from the analysis due to their small numbers represented in immigration 
offenses.6 Since multiple cases in the EOUSA match with a single USMS case (Kelly, 
2012), duplicates are deleted from analysis, and cases residing in the four district 
territories (Guam, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, and North Mariana Island) are also 
removed, restricting the analysis to 90 federal district courts. Because of the small 
                                                          
5 When this project first began, the FJSP was available until the year 2012.  
6 Future research should also examine how type of immigrant status affects federal court processing of 
immigration offenders.  
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number of case declinations, the analysis is restricted to cases that were accepted. Lastly, 
the year of arrest does not necessarily coincide with the year that the matter or case was 
filed or sentenced in the EOUSA, AOUSC, and USSC. As a result, a very small number 
of cases in the EOUSA, AOUSC, and USSC occur prior to the PROTECT period (prior 
to April 30th, 2003). Defendants whose matters or cases were filed or sentenced prior to 
2003 are removed from analysis because early disposition was not uniformly tracked 
prior to this time period. Ultimately, the final sample contains 309,002 defendants at case 
filing. After case filing, the FJSP does not contain outcome information for cases 
concluded in federal magistrate court, which drop out of the sample – 102,274 cases were 
filed in district court and matched to the USSC data. Cases with missing data on the 
dependent variables were removed, and crosstabs were performed to compare differences 
between defendants who remained in the sample and those who did not. Presentence 
detention had the most data missing (9,255 cases) followed by early disposition (1,821 
cases) and sentencing (114 cases). No data was missing on charge reduction. Defendants 
with missing information on presentence detention were more likely to be white 
Hispanic, female, younger, without children, and referred for illegal reentry from the 
Department of Homeland Security. Together, these variables indicate that missing 
information on presentence detention may be more likely for defendants who are held in 
immigration custody. Therefore, interpretation of findings for presentence detention must 
be qualified within this context. Few differences emerged between defendants with 
missing data on early disposition or sentence length.  
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Dependent Variables 
In accordance with a cumulative disadvantage approach, a series of dependent 
variables are used to capture multiple stages of the court process. Decision points are 
based on prior cumulative disadvantage research as well as prior federal courts and 
sentencing literature (see Hartley & Tillyer, 2012; Johnson, 2012; Johnson & Betsinger, 
2009; Kutateladze et al., 2014; Shermer & Johnson, 2010). The first dependent variable  
is filed in district court indicating whether a case is filed in magistrate court or filed in 
district court (1 = filed in district court, 0 = filed in magistrate court).  
Here it is important to distinguish between magistrate and district court because 
the two are qualitatively different. Federal magistrate judges are selected by a panel of 
lawyers and citizens and are appointed for a term of eight years (McCabe, 2014). Federal 
magistrate judges can rule on petty and misdemeanor offenses, which depending on the 
severity of the offense, can be sentenced for up to one year of incarceration (McCabe, 
2014). Federal magistrate judges cannot try or sentence felony cases, yet they can preside 
over civil issues when defendants agree to it. They are held accountable by the federal 
district judge (McCabe, 2014). As a result, federal magistrate judges play a significant 
role in immigration cases because of the large volume of petty and misdemeanor illegal 
entry cases and the distinct interconnection between civil and criminal issues in 
immigration cases. By contrast, cases filed in federal district court can be petty, 
misdemeanor, or felony cases and are presided over by U.S. attorneys and judges who are 
presidentially appointed. The most severe cases are subject to life in prison or the death 
penalty. While prosecutors are afforded latitude in their decisions, federal district judges 
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answer to the federal sentencing guidelines. Overall, extra-legal differences in the filing 
of cases in district court as opposed to magistrate court would suggest exposure of 
defendants to harsher treatment. Below, Figure 2 displays the linked flow of agency data 
and their corresponding decision points.  
Figure 2 Agency-linked data sets and their corresponding decision points 
 
 
 
The second dependent variable consists of presentence detention, reflecting 
whether a defendant is detained or released (1 = detained, 0 = released). The detention 
decision is usually made at two different time points – a few days after arrest and after a 
guilty plea is entered – but can happen at any time prior to sentencing (Reitler, Sullivan, 
& Frank, 2013). Only in very rare circumstances does the detention status of a defendant 
change after their initial pretrial hearing, especially in the case of immigration offenses 
(Garcia Hernandez, 2015; Reitler, Sullivan, & Frank, 2013). Therefore, presentence 
detention is examined prior to charge reduction, guideline departure, and sentence length.  
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The third dependent variable is early disposition (1 = early disposition, 0 = early 
disposition). Early disposition under 5K3.1 is a program that fast-tracks criminal 
immigration defendants through the federal court system. Early disposition was first 
implemented in southwestern border districts in the 1990s as a solution to increase 
efficiency in federal district courts with a large percentage of immigration cases (Cole, 
2012; McClellan & Sands, 2006). Technically, early disposition is considered a type of 
guideline departure but has several unique features that distinguish it from other types of 
departures. First, early disposition is given at the discretion of the prosecutor and requires 
the defendant to plead guilty within 30 days of being charged, to agree to not file any 
motions, and to waive the right to argue for a variance. In return, a defendant with a 
criminal history category below six can receive a four-level downward departure, and a 
defendant with a criminal history category of six can receive a two-level downward 
departure (Cole, 2012). This means a four-level reduction in the offense gravity score. 
Second and relatedly, early disposition falls temporally prior to other guideline 
departures. Third, for the years of the present study, early disposition is only an option in 
certain districts. By passing the PROTECT Act in 2003, Congress officially approved 
early disposition programs in select districts where the United States Attorney could 
demonstrate that the program would save the government significant resources 
(McClellan & Sands, 2006). In 2012, the U.S. Deputy Attorney sent a mandate that 
approved fast-track early disposition programs nationwide. For these reasons, early 
disposition is analyzed separately from other guideline departures and prior to charge 
reduction; however, participating in an early disposition program precludes the defendant 
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from qualifying for other types of guideline departures. Thus, the indirect effect of early 
disposition is assessed on charge reduction and sentence length but not on guideline 
departure.  
The fourth dependent variable is charge reduction, measuring whether charge 
severity is reduced from initial filing to termination (1 = reduced, 0 = not reduced). 
Charge severity is computed on a scale with 78 possible values where murder is the most 
severe charge, and a Class C misdemeanor is the least severe charge. To calculate charge 
reduction, the most severe charge at case filing is subtracted from the most severe charge 
at case termination. Then this variable is dichotomized with cases with a negative value 
coded as “1” and cases with a positive or zero value coded as “0.”7 
 The timing of charge reduction when measured as statutory severity is 
ambiguous. Most often charge bargaining occurs during plea negotiations prior to 
arraignment and departure decisions, but there are notable exceptions in the case of an 
early disposition agreement or a substantial assistance departure, which are wholly or 
partially determined by the prosecutor (Administrative Office of U.S. Courts; Boss & 
Angarella, 2006). The temporal order issue is partly accounted for in the circumstance of 
an early disposition agreement by separating early disposition out from other guideline 
departures and placing it temporally prior to charge reduction. Because downward and 
upward departures are applied after the final charge is decided upon (Office of General 
Counsel, 2014), charge reduction is placed between early disposition and guideline 
                                                          
7 The variable was dichotomized to reflect whether or not a charge reduction was received because most 
charges were decreased from a two-year to one-year period of incarceration. Charge reductions greater than 
a year were rare.  
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departures. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in some instances of substantial 
assistance and other government sponsored departures, charge reduction may come 
afterward. 
The fifth dependent variable is guideline departure. Guideline departure is coded 
into a multinomial outcome (1 = no departure within guidelines, 2 = downward departure, 
3 = substantial assistance departure, 4 = government assistance departure, 5 = upward 
departure).8 Cases ineligible for a guideline departure and cases given variances  
(sentences outside the guidelines that are not departures) post-Booker are removed from 
the guideline subsample (see Johnson, Ulmer, & Kramer, 2008; Office of General 
Counsel, 2014).  
The last variable is sentence length. Following previous federal sentencing work 
(Kim et al., 2016; Starr & Rehavi, 2013), sentence length is composed of a continuous 
variable ranging from 0 months representing probation and capped at 470 months. 
Because illegal reentry cases – the largest portion of immigration cases at sentencing – 
are concentrated on baseline offense level 8, sentence length is logged to reduce skew. 
Cases with zero months of imprisonment are assigned as .01. Below, Figure 3 presents 
the order of decision points for the present study.  
 
 
                                                          
8 There are two ways to examine guideline departures. When both upward and downward departures are of 
interest, they are investigated separately because they have different eligibility requirements (e.g. Johnson, 
2003, 2005). When downward departures are the primary focus, upward and downward departure are 
examined together as a four-category multinomial outcome (e.g. Johnson, Ulmer, & Kramer, 2008). I 
follow the second approach by including upward and downward departures together in my analyses 
because upward departures are extremely rare and only occur in less than 1% of immigration cases. 
Therefore, the focus and discussion centers on downward and substantial assistance departures.  
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Figure 3: Analytic order of decision points 
 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
The primary variables of interest are the defendant’s race and ethnicity. Ethnicity 
is not available in the USMS data, thus only race (white, black, and Asian) effects are 
examined at case filing. Ethnicity is added in the subsequent stages that rely on USSC 
background information. A series of dummy variables represent black non-Hispanic, 
black Hispanic, white non-Hispanic, white Hispanic, and Asian defendants; white non-
Hispanics are the reference category (see Johnson & Betsinger, 2009; Steffensmeier & 
Demuth, 2000).  
Control Variables 
A number of variables are controlled for that have been previously established as 
correlates of federal court processing outcomes (see Johnson, 2012; Johnson et al., 2008; 
Shermer & Johnson, 2010) to ensure that the effects of race and ethnicity are not 
spurious. The USMS and EOUSA differ from the AOUSC and USSC in the information 
and data they contain. Therefore, different variables are employed depending on the 
agency data and decision point. The following section is structured by listing the control 
variables and how they are constructed according to each dependent variable.  
Case filing Detention
Early 
disposition
Charge 
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Departure
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Filed in district court. The control variables for filed in district court are drawn 
from both the USMS and the EOUSA, which contain several demographic and legal 
factors including national priority status, multiple initial charges, offense type, arresting 
agency, and year the matter was concluded. Age and gender serve as demographic 
controls. Age is measured as a continuous variable, and a squared term for age is included 
to assess if the effect of age is nonlinear (Steffensmeier, Kramer, & Ulmer, 1995). 
Gender is a dichotomous variable representing female and male defendants (1 = female, 0 
= male).  
 National priority indicates whether a prosecutor assigns a case as a national or 
district priority (1 = national/district priority, 0 = neither national/district priority), and 
any type of offense can be assigned priority status under certain conditions (Johnson, 
2012). Multiple initial charges captures whether the defendant initially received multiple 
charges (1 = multiple charges, 0 = single charge). Offense type reflects the offense 
category of the primary charge. The primary offense type can change from arrest to 
charging because a defendant may be arrested for multiple offenses, such as citizenship 
fraud and a drug offense. At arrest, the primary offense may be citizenship fraud, but the 
primary charge may change to a drug offense which is why the primary charge does not 
always coincide with an immigration offense. Accordingly, offense type is coded 
separately at each stage of the court process. For example, offense type at case filing 
depends on the primary charge at arrest, whereas offense type for charge reduction 
depends on the primary charge after case filing. In addition, offense types coded after 
case filing consist of other offense categories outside of immigration cases. Nine dummy 
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variables are created to measure offense type consisting of Illegal Reentry, Alien 
Smuggling, False Citizenship, Immigration-Other, Violent, Property, Drug, Weapon, and 
Other, with Illegal Entry cases designated as the reference category.  
A control variable is also included for arrest agency. Arrest agency indicates 
whether an arrest was made by the Department of Homeland Security, which is 
responsible for the majority of arrests, or another type of agency, such as the U.S. 
Marshals, the Drug Enforcement Administration, or local law enforcement agency (1 = 
other type of arrest agency, 0 = Department of Homeland Security). Type of law 
enforcement agency is used as a control for case filing decisions for two reasons. First, 
Johnson (2012) noted that the source of arrest had a significant influence on case filing 
decisions. This may have to do with different relationships between prosecutors and 
referral agencies. Second, the Department of Homeland Security has a heavy hand in the 
screening of cases in some districts where their actors may actually preside over petty or 
misdemeanor cases. The year of case filing, charging, or sentencing is also included 
depending on the outcome of interest.9 
Presentence detention through sentence length. The remaining control 
variables are pulled from the AOUSC and USSC. For each dependent variable after case 
filing (i.e. presentence detention, guideline departure, charge reduction, and sentence 
length), the following control variables are included: age, gender, level of education, 
number of dependents, type of counsel, multiple charges or convictions, offense type, 
offense severity, criminal history, acceptance of responsibility, and conviction by trial. 
                                                          
9 Year and guideline reform era were highly collinear. Therefore, the final models only contain the year 
dummies.  
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Following prior research (Johnson et al., 2008), level of education is dichotomized into 
whether some college education was completed compared to no college education (1 = 
some college education, 0 = no college education). Similarly, number of dependents 
measures whether the defendant has financial dependents or not (1 = financial 
dependents, 0 = no financial dependents).10  
Legal variables are also based on prior federal court research that examines both 
charging and sentencing decisions (see Johnson, 2012; Shermer & Johnson, 2010). Type 
of counsel reflects defense counsel provided by a private attorney (1 = private attorney, 0 
= other type of counsel).11 Multiple charges is drawn from the EOUSA and is included as 
a control for presentence detention, early disposition, and charge reduction (1 = multiple 
charges, 0 = single charge). For guideline departure and sentence length, multiple 
convictions is pulled from the USSC and indicates whether the defendant was convicted 
of multiple offenses (1 = multiple convictions, 0 = single conviction). In addition, offense 
type of the most serious filing charge is controlled for in the presentence detention, early 
disposition, and charge reduction models through nine dummy variables for Illegal Entry, 
False Citizenship, Immigration-Other, Violent, Property, Drug, Weapon, and Public. 
Illegal reentry becomes the reference category because most illegal entry cases drop from 
the analysis after being concluded in magistrate court. Subsequent stages after case filing 
                                                          
10 Prior research has suggested that whether the defendant has dependents is an important factor in 
courtroom decision making, yet 9% of cases have missing data. Thus, I follow previous sentencing research 
that has addressed this issue and add a dummy indicator for missing data to both keep the integrity of the 
sample and keep the estimates unbiased (see Johnson et al., 2008; Ulmer, Eisenstein, & Johnson, 2009).   
11 As with dependents, type of counsel is very important to case processing but 18% of cases has missing 
values. Therefore, a dummy variable is added for data missing on type of counsel (see Johnson et al., 2008; 
Ulmer, Eisenstein, & Johnson, 2009). The dummy variables for both dependents and type of counsel are 
included in the analysis, but not presented in the tables.  
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only examine cases filed in district court because the FJSP does not contain outcomes for 
cases filed in magistrate court. Using the same coding scheme, offense type of the most 
serious convicted offense is also included in the models for guideline departure and 
sentence length.  
Offense severity is measured in two ways (see Johnson, 2012). First, for 
presentence detention, early disposition, and charge reduction, offense severity is a 
continuous scale measuring the maximum severity level of the most serious filing 
charge.12 Second, for guideline departure and sentence length, offense severity is 
measured through the presumptive guideline sentence (Engen & Gainey, 2000). Like 
sentence length, the presumptive guideline sentence is logged to reduce skew, and cases 
with a value of zero are assigned to .01. While the presumptive guideline sentence takes 
criminal history and acceptance of responsibility into account, several studies have shown 
that both legal factors have independent effects on courtroom actors’ decision making 
(Hartley & Tillyer, 2012; Shermer & Johnson, 2010; Johnson et al., 2008). In the case of 
immigration offenses, criminal history and acceptance of responsibility are particularly 
salient because they can determine the offense type and offense severity level (Hartley & 
Tillyer, 2012; Kim et al., 2015; U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2015). Accordingly, the 
defendant’s criminal history is controlled for through the six-level criminal history score. 
In addition, a variable is included that captures whether the defendant accepts 
                                                          
12 The most serious filing charge was introduced for the original models examining presentence detention, 
early disposition, and charge reduction, but it was too collinear (VIF = 21) with offense type. Bivariate 
correlations demonstrated that illegal entry was the culprit (r = -.8). Illegal entry is a misdemeanor, and all 
misdemeanors are their own separate category on the offense severity scale. The findings did not 
significantly change once offense severity was removed from analyses.  
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responsibility for the offense (1 = does not accept responsibility, 0 = accepts 
responsibility). Acceptance of responsibility indicates whether the defendant provided 
timely notification of his or her intentions to plead guilty (United States Sentencing 
Commission, 2015).  Convicted by trial (1 = trial conviction, 0 = guilty plea) controls for 
whether the defendant was convicted by trial or was convicted by a guilty plea.  
Finally, as the analyses are conducted, prior case processing decisions are added 
to each subsequent stage. For example, presentence detention is included as a control in 
early disposition, charge reduction, guideline departure, and sentence length. Likewise, 
early disposition is controlled for in the models predicting charge reduction and sentence 
length, and charge reduction is included in the models predicting guideline departure and 
sentence length. Similarly, guideline departure (with the full sample) is added to the 
model predicting sentence length.  
Analytic Strategy 
White Hispanic defendants are disproportionately represented in immigration 
cases, constituting approximately 90% of immigration cases. Because the hypotheses 
state that black non-Hispanic, black Hispanic, white Hispanic, and Asian defendants are 
treated more harshly than white non-Hispanic defendants, it is necessary to assign white 
non-Hispanic defendants as the reference category. Due to the large size of white 
Hispanic defendants in the sample, a random 20% subsample of white Hispanic 
defendants is selected for stages after case filing – 18,363 cases remain for analysis on 
outcomes from presentence detention through sentence length.13  
                                                          
13 Analyses were also run using the full sample with white Hispanics assigned as the reference category to 
ensure the robustness of the results. No differences emerged.  
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Importantly, selection bias has been a primary issue of concern in sentencing 
literature because of multiple case processing stages where defendants are not randomly 
filtered out of the criminal justice system (e.g. case acceptance and the decision to 
incarcerate) (Bushway, Johnson, & Slocum, 2007). Scholars have used various 
techniques to account for any bias that may result from analyzing a subsample 
systematically different from the original population, such as Heckman’s (1979) two-step 
modeling (see Berk, 1983; Heckman, 1979). Significant difficulty arises, however, when 
trying to estimate selection models for sentencing studies because theoretical variables 
that affect the selection outcome and not the dependent variable are typically unavailable. 
Consequently, the lack of exclusion restrictions can introduce significant 
multicollinearity into the models (Bushway et al., 2007).  
An additional issue specific to immigration cases is that sample attrition primarily 
occurs at case filing, and the FJSP does not contain information on outcomes for cases 
concluded in magistrate court where most immigration cases are filed. Moreover, 
ethnicity is not available at the case filing stage making it impossible to employ selection 
modeling that includes ethnicity (in other words, a model that predicts case filing using 
ethnicity and other variables). Because the present study does not meet the requirements 
to conduct selection models without exclusion restrictions (see Bushway et al., 2007; 
Stolzenberg & Relles, 1997), selection bias remains unaccounted for in the present study. 
Therefore, findings from presentence detention through sentence length should be 
interpreted as being conditional upon selection after the case filing stage.  
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Analyses begin with diagnostic tests to detect any multicollinearity issues. 
Diagnostic tests include variance inflation factors (VIF) and condition index values 
(Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980). Once diagnostic tests are conducted, a series of 
multivariate regressions proceed in the following stages. To address Hypotheses 1 and 2, 
race and ethnicity are first regressed on each decision point from case filing (ethnicity is 
included after case filing) through sentence length to establish a baseline relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables.14 Second, the full multivariate models 
are run to determine the main effects of race and ethnicity on court outcomes, net of 
controls. Logistic regression is used to model case filing, presentence detention, early 
disposition, and charge reduction. Multinomial regression is used for guideline departure, 
and ordinary least squares regression is employed for sentence length. Because 
defendants are nested within districts, fixed effect models are run for all models.15 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 assess cumulative disadvantage through the indirect and total 
effects of race and ethnicity from presentence detention through sentence length. In this 
second part of the analysis, the present study follows Wooldredge et al.’s (2015) lead by 
including the full sample across all decision points. As Wooldredge et al. (2015, p. 17) 
state, “Because our interest in this segment of the analysis involved evaluating race 
effects across decision points rather than treating these decisions as discrete, the entire 
sample…was used for estimating all paths.” After employing structural equation models, 
                                                          
14 Baseline models can be seen in the Appendix.  
15 Missing data can harm the validity of a study, and there are several ways to deal with this issue. For the 
present study, listwise deletion is used because this method follows prior federal sentencing research (e.g. 
Doerner & Demuth, 2010; Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2009; Ulmer, Eisenstein, & Johnson, 2010). To my 
knowledge, all studies to date that use the federal court data employ listwise deletion.  
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the indirect and total effects of race and ethnicity are calculated in Stata 13 using nlcom 
commands. To test Hypothesis 3, the total indirect effect is estimated by adding the 
impact of all previous decision points together for each individual stage of the court 
process. To test Hypothesis 4, the indirect and direct effects of race and ethnicity are 
summed to determine the total effect for early disposition through sentence length.  
Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used at case filing that 
come from the USMS and EOUSA. As mentioned previously, the USMS and EOUSA 
contain different information than the AOUSA and USSC. Table 2 presents the 
descriptive statistics for variables from presentence detention through sentence length 
which were drawn from the AOUSA and USSC. Descriptive statistics are based on the 
full data before a random sample of white Hispanic defendants were pulled. Model 
diagnostic tests indicate no harmful levels of multicollinearity. Specifically, variance 
inflation factors (VIF) among all the variables were below the standard ceiling of 4 
(Wooldridge, 2009), and the condition index values were under the cutoff of 30 (Belsley 
et al., 1980).  
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Hypothesis 1 
Case Filing. Turning to the effect of race on case filing, Table 3 reveals that as 
hypothesized, black and Asian defendants are more likely to have their cases filed in 
district courts. As discussed earlier, information on ethnicity is unavailable at this stage 
because the data for the analysis of case filing are from the USMS, so the comparison 
category includes both white Hispanics and white non-Hispanics. Nevertheless, 
statistically significant racial differences exist indicating that black (b = 2.098, p < 0.001) 
and Asian defendants (b = 1.872, p < 0.01) are further processed into the federal court 
system, thereby being exposed to harsher treatment, such as the possibility of a lengthier 
incarceration.  
Hypothesis 2  
Hypothesis 2a: Presentence Detention. Table 4 displays the results of race and 
ethnicity on presentence detention. Inspection of Table 4 suggests that in support of 
Hypothesis 2a, white Hispanic (b = .967, p < 0.001) and black non-Hispanic defendants 
(b = .545, p < 0.05) are more likely to be detained than white non-Hispanic defendants 
prior to sentencing; however, both black Hispanic and Asian defendants are treated 
similarly to white non-Hispanic defendants.  
Hypothesis 2b: Early Disposition. Table 5 presents the effects of race and 
ethnicity on early disposition. Investigation of Table 5 indicates that in support of 
Hypothesis 2b, black non-Hispanic (b = -1.674, p < 0.001), black Hispanic (b = -.936, p 
<0.01), and Asian (b = -1.492, p < 0.001) defendants are less likely to receive early  
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Table 3. The Effects of Race on Case Filing Decisions
Variable b S.E. 
Black 2.098 *** .582
Asian 1.872 ** .658
Female -.710 *** .151
Age .036 ** .012
Age-squared -.001 ** .000
Multiple charges -2.397 1.580
Illegal reentry 5.693 *** .758
Citizenship fraud 6.462 *** 1.241
Other immigration 7.167 *** 1.354
Violent 7.571 *** 1.823
Weapon 7.848 *** 1.351
Drug 7.348 *** 1.484
Public 2.053 *** .598
Property 6.685 *** 1.483
Priority -1.637 *** .467
Other arrest agency 2.721 *** .351
Year 2004 .454 .420
Year 2006 -.735 *** .191
Year 2007 -.817 ** .257
Year 2008 -1.148 *** .242
Year 2009 -1.220 *** .148
Year 2010 -1.405 *** .133
Constant -1.733 ** .564
Note: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
†Multiplied by 100
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Table 4. Effects of Race and Ethnicity on Presentence Detention
Variable   S.E. 
White Hispanic .967 *** .286
Black Non-Hispanic .545 * .228
Black Hispanic .386 .321
Asian -.203 .323
Female -.740 *** .237
Age -.016 ** .006
Age-squared† -.030 .031
Dependents -.108 .164
Missing dependents 1.281 * .645
Education -.399 * .149
Multiple charges .013 .181
Illegal entry -.635 * .303
Citizenship fraud -.712 .375
Other immigration -1.048 *** .300
Violent or weapon -.030 .604
Drug .407 .770
Property -.974 *** .228
Public order -.632 .478
Criminal history .137 .075
Private counsel -1.043 *** .138
Missing counsel .621 .348
Trial -.679 * .300
No acceptance .164 .272
Year 2003 .331 .316
Year 2004 -.149 .153
Year 2006 -.010 .176
Year 2007 .356 .259
Year 2008 -.042 .212
Year 2009 .396 * .174
Year 2010 .531 *** .123
Constant 2.87 *** .361
Note: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
†Multiplied by 100
b
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Table 5. Effects of Race and Ethnicity on Early Disposition
Variable b S.E. 
White Hispanic .286 * .143
Black Non-Hispanic -1.674 ** .506
Black Hispanic -.936 ** .305
Asian -1.492 *** .334
Female -.342 * .157
Age† -.046 .306
Age-squared† .002 .012
Dependents .087 .060
Missing dependents .863 .448
Education -.017 .070
Multiple charges -.378 .417
Illegal entry -1.681 * .823
Citizenship fraud -.175 .787
Other immigration .236 .437
Violent or weapon -1.41 * .633
Drug -1.676 ** .606
Property -3.391 *** .638
Public order -.517 .686
Criminal history .185 ** .067
Private counsel -.638 .378
Missing counsel -1.186 * .586
No acceptance -1.45 *** .412
Year 2003 -.502 * .255
Year 2004 .106 .164
Year 2006 -.092 .127
Year 2007 -.060 .132
Year 2008 -.156 .133
Year 2009 -.260 .165
Year 2010 -.209 .171
Presentence detention .998 ** .373
Constant -2.620 *** .446
Note: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
†Multiplied by 100
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disposition than white non-Hispanic defendants. Yet, further investigation of Table 5 
shows that contrary to Hypothesis 2b, white Hispanic defendants are more likely to 
receive early disposition than white non-Hispanic defendants (b = .286, p < 0.05). Except 
for white Hispanic defendants, Hypothesis 2b is supported. 
Hypothesis 2c: Charge Reduction. Table 6 presents the effects of race and 
ethnicity on charge reduction. No significant effect exists for white Hispanic, black  
Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, or Asian defendants, thus suggesting no support for 
Hypothesis 2c at charge reduction.  
Hypothesis 2d: Guideline Departure. The next stage examined is guideline 
departure. As noted previously, the analysis for guideline departure is conducted on a 
subsample of cases eligible for departure. Because early disposition occurs quickly 
(within 30 days of being charged) and prevents defendants from being eligible for other 
departure types, defendants who received early disposition are also removed from the 
analysis. Four departure types are examined: downward departure, substantial assistance 
departure, other government assistance departures, and upward departures. Upward 
departures comprise less than 1% of all cases. Therefore, the focus is on downward, 
substantial assistance, and other government assistance departures.  
Turning to Table 7, Model 1 displays the impact of race and ethnicity on 
downward departures and demonstrates that race and ethnicity have no significant impact 
on downward departures. Proceeding to Model 2, the model highlights the impact of race 
and ethnicity on substantial assistance departures. Model 2 reveals that black Hispanic (b 
= -1.07, p < 0.05) and white Hispanic (b = -1.006, p < 0.001) defendants are significantly  
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Table 6. Effects of Race and Ethnicity on Charge Reduction
Variable b S.E. 
White Hispanic -.165 .193
Black Non-Hispanic -.097 .345
Black Hispanic -.663 .355
Asian -.261 .413
Female .526 * .172
Age .002 .007
Age-squared† .065 .044
Dependents .286 .089
Missing dependents .339 .429
Education -.234 .214
Multiple charges 2.35 *** .361
Illegal entry 6.649 *** .939
Citizenship fraud 7.782 *** 1.095
Other immigration 5.054 *** .737
Violent  7.243 *** .385
Weapon 7.063 *** .872
Drug 7.579 *** .718
Property 7.230 *** .767
Public order 7.412 *** .580
Criminal history .126 .083
Private counsel -.332 .408
Missing counsel 1.058 *** .272
Trial -.078 .605
No acceptance -.697 .472
Year 2003 .492 .348
Year 2004 .304 .245
Year 2006 .231 .283
Year 2007 .463 .281
Year 2008 .320 .241
Year 2009 .391 .289
Year 2010 .392 .269
Presentence detention -.006 .266
Early disposition .764 * .342
Constant -11.068 *** 1.019
Note: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
†Multiplied by 100
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less likely to receive a substantial assistance departure than white non-Hispanic 
defendants. Last, Model 3 presents the results for other government sponsored departures 
where race and ethnicity have no statistically significant impact. Overall then, partial 
support exists for Hypothesis 2d at guideline departure.  
Hypothesis 2e: Sentence Length. Table 8 presents the effects of race and 
ethnicity on sentence length. Table 8 suggests that black Hispanic defendants (b = .203, p 
< 0.05) receive a longer sentence than white non-Hispanic defendants. By contrast, white 
Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, and Asian defendants exhibit no statistically significant 
relationship with sentence length. The findings lend partial support to Hypothesis 2e.   
Hypothesis 3  
Hypothesis 3a: Early Disposition. Recall that Hypothesis 3 begins to investigate 
cumulative disadvantage by examining the indirect effect of race/ethnicity through prior 
stages. Table 9 presents indirect race/ethnicity effects from early disposition through 
sentence length as well as the total indirect effect (the sum of all previous stages).  Model 
1 in Table 9 shows a significant indirect effect of presentence detention on early 
disposition for white Hispanic (b = .816, p < 0.001) and black non-Hispanic defendants 
(b = .442, p < 0.05). Nevertheless, the findings are opposite of what was predicted by 
Hypothesis 3a. White Hispanic and black non-Hispanic defendants are more likely than 
white non-Hispanic defendants to receive early disposition through their increased 
likelihood of being detained. No significant indirect effect exists at early disposition for 
black Hispanic and Asian defendants. Together, the findings for white Hispanic, black 
non-Hispanic, black Hispanic, and Asian defendants do not support Hypothesis 3a.  
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Hypothesis 3b: Charge reduction. Table 9 presents the indirect and total indirect 
effect of race/ethnicity on charge reduction. Although race/ethnicity has no direct impact 
on charge reduction, black non-Hispanic (b = -1.627, p < 0.01), black Hispanic  
(b = -1.001, p < 0.01), and Asian (b = -.887, p < 0.05) defendants are less likely to 
receive a charge reduction through the decreased likelihood of receiving early 
disposition. The total indirect effect is also significant for black non-Hispanic (b = -1.594, 
p < 0.01), black Hispanic (b = -.974, p < 0.01), and Asian defendants (b = -.885, p < 
0.05). Notably, no significant indirect effect exists for white Hispanics primarily because 
they are more likely to receive early disposition than white non-Hispanic defendants. 
With the exception of white Hispanic defendants, Hypothesis 3b is supported at charge 
reduction.  
Hypothesis 3c: Guideline Departure. Next, the indirect effects of race/ethnicity 
are examined for guideline departures. Table 9 indicates that race/ethnicity has no impact 
on downward departure through presentence detention, charge reduction, or the total 
indirect effect. Turning to substantial assistance departures, the findings reveal that white 
Hispanic defendants (b = -1.042, p < 0.01) and black non-Hispanic defendants (b = -.564; 
p < 0.05) are significantly less likely to receive a substantial assistance departure through 
presentence detention. In addition, the total indirect effect is significant for white 
Hispanic defendants (b = -.981, p < 0.01). No significant indirect effects exist for black 
Hispanic and Asian defendants at substantial assistance departure. 
 Lastly, Table 9 also presents the effects for government assistance departures. 
Again, no statistically significant indirect effect of race/ethnicity through prior decision 
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points emerges for white Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, black Hispanic, and Asian 
defendants at government assistance departure. Minimal support for Hypothesis 3c is 
garnered at guideline departure.  
Hypothesis 3d: Sentence Length. Turning to sentencing, presentence detention 
emerges as a significant indirect pathway by which white Hispanic (b = 1.162, p < 0.001) 
and black non-Hispanic (b = .629, p < 0.001) defendants receive longer sentences. The 
decreased likelihood of early disposition also results in lengthier sentences for black non-
Hispanic (b = .527, p < 0.001), black Hispanic (b = .324, p < 0.001), and Asian 
defendants (b = .282, p < 0.05). In addition, race/ethnicity decreases the likelihood of a 
substantial assistance departure which in turn increases sentence length for white 
Hispanic (b = .613, p < 0.001), black non-Hispanic (b = .521, p < 0.01), and black 
Hispanic (b = .725, p < 0.01) defendants. Finally, white Hispanic (b = 1.602, p < 0.001), 
black non-Hispanic (b = 1.975, p < 0.001), and black Hispanic defendants (b = 1.757, p < 
0.001) receive lengthier sentences through the total indirect effect of presentence 
detention, early disposition, charge reduction, and guideline departure. By contrast, the 
total indirect effect of race through prior stages is insignificant for Asian defendants. In 
sum, Hypothesis 3d is partially supported at sentence length. 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 continues to examine cumulative disadvantage for white Hispanic, 
black Hispanic, black non-Hispanic and Asian defendants through the total effect of race 
and ethnicity. The total effect is calculated by adding the total indirect effect from 
previous stages and the direct effect of race/ethnicity. 
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Hypothesis 4a: Early disposition. At early disposition, the total effect of 
race/ethnicity is significant for white Hispanic defendants, black Hispanic, and Asian 
defendants. Contrary to what Hypothesis 4a would predict, the total effect of ethnicity is 
positive for white Hispanic defendants. Through a cumulative impact of race/ethnicity, 
white Hispanic defendants are more likely to receive early disposition (b = 1.005, p < 
.001). By contrast, the total effect of race/ethnicity for black Hispanic (b = -.974, p < 
0.01) and Asian (b = -1.365, p < 0.01) defendants is negative meaning that black 
Hispanic and Asian defendants are less likely to receive early disposition than white non-
Hispanic defendants. The total effect for black non-Hispanic defendants at early 
disposition is not statistically significant. Hypothesis 4a is partially supported at early 
disposition. 
Hypothesis 4b: Charge Reduction. At charge reduction, cumulative 
disadvantage operates through race/ethnicity’s total effect for Black non-Hispanic (b = -
1.691, p < 0.001), black Hispanic (b = -1.598, p < 0.01), and Asian defendants (b = -
1.122, p < 0.05). White Hispanic defendants displayed no statistically significant total 
effect at charge reduction. Except for white Hispanic defendants, Hypothesis 4b is 
supported.  
Hypothesis 4c: Guideline Departure. The total effects of race/ethnicity are next 
examined at guideline departure. The total effect of race/ethnicity is not significant for 
downward departure; however, cumulative disadvantage is present at substantial 
assistance departure. The findings reveal that white Hispanic (b = -.2.056, p < 0.01), 
black non-Hispanic (b = -1.331, p < 0.01), and black Hispanic (b = -1.276, p < 0.01) 
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defendants are less likely to receive a substantial assistance departure through the total 
effect of race/ethnicity. By contrast, Asian defendants are more likely to receive a 
substantial assistance departure through the total effect of race (b = 1.005, p < 0.05). In 
sum, Hypothesis 4c is partially supported for substantial assistance departure. 
Hypothesis 4d: Sentence Length. Turning to the cumulative effects of race/ 
ethnicity on sentence length, white Hispanic (b = 1.633, p < 0.001), black non-Hispanic 
(b = 1.983, p < 0.001), and black Hispanic defendants (b = 1.948, p < 0.001) receive a 
lengthier sentence through the total effect of race/ethnicity. Lastly, there is no total race 
effect on sentence length for Asian defendants. In sum, Hypothesis 4d is partially 
supported at sentence length.  
Discussion 
Summary 
 
Table 10. Summary of Hypotheses Testing
Race (case filing) Black Asian
Race and Ethnicity White Hispanic Black Hispanic Black non-Hispanic         AsianAsian
Hypothesis 1 Increased likelihood of filing in district court ✓ ✓✓
Hypothesis 2 Direct effects 
     Hypothesis 2a Increased likelihood of presentence detention ✓ ✓
     Hypothesis 2b Reduced likelihood of early disposition ✓ ✓ ✓✓
     Hypothesis 2c Reduced likelihood of charge reduction
     Hypothesis 2d Reduced likelihood of guideline departure ✓ ✓
     Hypothesis 2e Increased sentence length ✓
Hypothesis 3 Total indirect effects
     Hypothesis 3a Reduced likelihood of early disposition
     Hypothesis 3b Reduced likelihood of charge reduction ✓ ✓ ✓
     Hypothesis 3c Reduced likelihood guideline departure ✓
     Hypothesis 3d Increased sentence length ✓ ✓ ✓
Hypothesis 4 Total effects
     Hypothesis 4a Reduced likelihood of early disposition ✓ ✓
     Hypothesis 4b Reduced likelihood of charge reduction ✓ ✓ ✓
     Hypothesis 4c Reduced likelihood guideline departure ✓ ✓ ✓
     Hypothesis 4d Increased sentence length ✓ ✓ ✓
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The goal of this paper was to complete a comprehensive assessment on whether 
racial and ethnic disparity exist in an understudied group of offenses—immigration cases. 
Both the social and political context surrounding immigration cases as well as their  
unique embeddedness with the civil system call for a closer examination of racial and 
ethnic differences in the processing of immigration cases. Accordingly, four overarching 
hypotheses were developed. The results of the hypotheses test are summarized in Table 
10. Upon examination of Table 10, some patterns emerge from the results. First, black 
Hispanic and black non-Hispanic defendants consistently receive harsher treatment than 
white non-Hispanic defendants throughout the federal court process. The total effect for 
black non-Hispanic and black Hispanic defendants is particularly pronounced. In fact, 
cumulative disadvantage is present at every stage of the court process for black Hispanic 
defendants. By contrast, the treatment of white Hispanic and Asian defendants is less 
predictable and dependent on the outcome.  
Theoretical and Policy Implications 
 With a few exceptions, the findings regarding black non-Hispanic and black 
Hispanic defendants support the hypotheses and are consistent with the general courts 
and sentencing literature and the focal concerns perspective (see Steffensmeier et al., 
1998; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000). The findings are also consistent with Calavita’s 
(2007) argument that implicit racial stereotypes of African Americans as more dangerous 
and criminally prone may be transferred onto black and black Hispanic noncitizens in 
immigration cases; however, additional data with direct measures of courtroom actor 
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perceptions are necessary to confirm the mechanisms linking race/ethnicity to harsher 
court outcomes.  
The findings for white Hispanic defendants also align with the focal concerns 
perspective. Overall, white Hispanic defendants were on the receiving end of harsher 
treatment at various stages. Notably though, they were more likely to receive early 
disposition compared to white non-Hispanic defendants which significantly reduces 
sentencing severity. This finding may facially appear to benefit white Hispanic 
defendants; however, deportation is often included in early disposition agreements 
(Eagly, 2010; Logue, 2009). Therefore, the increased likelihood of early disposition may 
simply reflect a different avenue of social control in the form of deportation. White 
Hispanics may be targeted for deportation through early disposition because they are 
most likely to be from Mexico where proximity to the United States border enables an 
expedited deportation process (Logue, 2009). In a similar vein, early disposition and fast-
track departures were created primarily for handling the rapidly growing number of 
illegal reentry cases imposed on Southwest federal courts (McClellan & Sands, 2006), 
and Hispanic defendants are typically associated with illegal reentry (Chacon, 2007).  
The results were mixed for Asian defendants. At some decision points, Asian 
defendants received harsher treatment consistent with Wu and Kim’s (2012) research, but 
at other stages, the findings align more with sentencing research that has found a “model 
minority” effect (e.g. Johnson & Betsinger, 2009), thus negating some of the harsher 
punishment for Asian defendants that was observed for black non-Hispanic and black 
Hispanic defendants.  
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The results from the present study further builds on literature that promotes a 
cumulative disadvantage approach in the study of racial and ethnic disparity (e.g. 
Baumer, 2013, Kutateladze et al., 2014; Stolzenberg et al., 2013; Wooldredge et al, 
2015). If the analysis only examined a single stage or the direct effects of race and 
ethnicity, the results would be misleading. For example, one may conclude that white 
Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, or black Hispanic defendants were treated similarly to 
white non-Hispanic defendants if charge reduction or sentence length were the only 
outcomes examined in this study. Therefore, the indirect and total effects of race and 
ethnicity were especially enlightening. Although there was no direct effect for white 
Hispanic defendants or black non-Hispanic defendants at charge reduction or sentence 
length, through the cumulative effects of prior stages, they were assigned longer 
sentences that would otherwise have been masked.  
The findings also support the descriptive literature on immigration cases by 
shedding empirical light on how they are uniquely handled at each stage of the court 
process and how criminal justice actors have taken advantage of the civil immigration 
system to decrease Constitutional protections of immigration cases (Eagley, 2010; 
Legomsky, 2007; Stumpf, 2006). Specifically, illegal entry cases are mostly handled in 
U.S. Magistrate Court, and the majority of immigration cases are sent through magistrate 
rather than district court. Moreover, cases that are arrested by an agency (e.g., U.S. 
Marshalls Service, local law enforcement agency, and the Drug Enforcement Agency) 
outside of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security have a greater likelihood of being 
filed into U.S. District Court. This may be due to the increasing heavy hand that the U.S. 
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Department of Homeland Security plays in adjudicating cases in U.S. Magistrate Court 
(Eagly, 2010). Moreover, 25% of cases receive an early disposition plea agreement that 
decreases sentence length but is also contingent on bypassing many Constitutional 
protections that may have civil consequences which is unable to be ascertained from the 
current data. 
Relatedly, another result unique to immigration offenses is the fact that going to 
trial decreases the likelihood of being detained prior to sentencing and has no significant 
relationship with sentence length. In addition, the use of a private attorney also decreases 
the likelihood of being detained and the length of a sentence. Together, these findings 
suggest that immigration defendants who activate their Constitutional rights and who 
have the resources of a private attorney have significantly better outcomes than those 
who do not. In particular, their time in confinement is significantly reduced through 
release prior to sentencing and receiving a shorter sentence length. One way then to 
combat some of the consequences of crimmigration may be educating and assisting 
immigration defendants with knowing and utilizing their Constitutional protections and 
providing access to private attorneys.  
One direction for future research would be to take a further nuanced approach to 
examining unwarranted disparity by focusing on national origin. Through investigation of 
general categories of race and ethnicity, Hispanic defendants are lumped into two racial 
and ethnic groups, when in actuality Hispanic ethnicity comprises individuals from 
various countries with different cultures and relationships to the United States (Logue, 
2009, 2017), and the United States has historically formed immigration policies based on 
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their political and social standings with certain countries (Ogletree, 2000). For instance, 
the United States’ political stance on communism led to a more welcoming policy toward 
refugees seeking relief from communist countries (Ogletree, 2000). Country of origin has 
also been used as a method to indirectly identify race and stem the flow of immigration 
from countries that contained a larger portion of immigrants of color (Ngai, 1999).  
In particular, the current study exemplifies the need for research using national 
origin in the treatment of black Hispanic defendants. While black Hispanic defendants 
were assigned harsher treatment at every stage of the court process, they were no more 
likely to receive presentence detention than white non-Hispanic defendants. Because 
presentence detention is particularly interdependent with deportation status and the civil 
immigration system, this finding for black Hispanic defendants may be related to civil 
immigration issues and national origin. Self-identified black Hispanics are concentrated 
in Cuba, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic (Lopez & Gonzalez-Barrera, 2016), and 
Cuba has a unique political standing with the United States. Historically, the United 
States has taken a deferential approach in immigration policy toward Cuban immigrants 
manifested in the 1966 Cuban Readjustment Act (Ogletree, 2000). In the present study, 
white Cuban noncitizens are mixed in with other white Hispanic defendants, such as 
Mexican noncitizens who constitute an overwhelming percentage of the white Hispanic 
defendants and who have been the primary targets for deportation. Thus, black Hispanic 
defendants may benefit from their national origin at presentence detention. Examining 
national origin would clarify these results. 
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A second direction for future research would be to examine the interaction effects 
between race, ethnicity, gender, age, and other extra-legal characteristics. While the 
present study focused on racial and ethnic disparity, the findings also found preferential 
treatment for female defendants, defendants with dependents and higher levels of 
education, and a curvilinear association with age. This is consistent with previous 
literature on the extralegal factors associated with sentencing (Bontrager, Barrick, & 
Stupi, 2013; Bushway & Piehl, 2007; Daly & Bordt, 1995; Spohn & Holleran, 2000; 
Steffensmeier et al., 1995). Indeed, most research has found that the effects of race and 
ethnicity are dependent upon other extralegal characteristics (see Baumer, 2013; Ulmer, 
2012; Spohn, 2000; Zatz, 2000). Therefore, findings from this study may be further 
amplified by gender, age, employment, and educational status. Certainly, academic 
attainment may play a salient role within immigration cases and should be further 
examined because Hispanic noncitizens are most likely to have the lowest levels of 
education than any other racial/ethnic group (Covarrubias & Lara, 2013). To that end, 
future research investigating how education affects courts and sentencing practices 
should incorporate a more nuanced measure of educational attainment that includes 
middle school, years of high school, and college.  
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, immigration offenses comprise the largest portion of cases entering 
U.S. Federal Courts, and the results from the present study indicate that race and ethnicity 
are clear factors in decision making throughout the court process. Direct effects of race 
and ethnicity were more prevalent at stages presided over by prosecutors, such as case 
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filing, early disposition, and substantial assistance departures. In turn, race and ethnicity 
had indirect and total effects on sentence length. The findings are also consistent with the 
crimmigration literature that describes a diminished form of justice for defendants in 
criminal immigration cases. Accordingly, the present study upholds immigration 
scholars’ concerns over the harsher treatment of immigrants of color, and it exposes 
unfair practices in handling one of the primary offense types in federal district courts.  
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CHAPTER 3: CONTEXTUAL DISPARITY WITHIN FEDERAL IMMIGRATION 
CASES 
Overview 
Since 1980, the number of immigrants entering the United States has rapidly 
increased. According to current statistics, the foreign-born population has more than 
doubled in size from 14.1 million (6.2% of the total population) to 40 million in 2010 
(12.9% of the total population) (Gibson & Jung, 2006; Grieco et al., 2012), and the 
undocumented immigrant population has expanded from 3.5 million in 1990 to 11.3 
million in 2010 (Pew Research Center, 2014). In response to the changing demographics, 
politicians and the media have evoked the general public’s fear by playing to stereotypes 
of immigrants as criminal and dangerous, disregarding the robust empirical research that 
has demonstrated a negative or insignificant link between immigration and crime (Hagan, 
Levi, & Dovitzer, 2008; Hagan & Palloni, 1999; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Wang, 2012). 
As a result, immigration scholars have focused on how perceived threat of immigrants 
has resulted in the irrational criminalization of immigration. Furthermore, literature has 
begun to accumulate on how locations in the United States with the greatest relative 
increases in immigration have taken the harshest stance toward immigration regulation 
(Zatz & Smith, 2012).  
At the same time, because of advances in multilevel leveling, the number of 
sentencing studies investigating contextual disparity and environmental factors that 
facilitate racial and ethnic disparity proliferated (Britt, 2000; Fearn, 2005; Feldmeyer, 
Warren, Siennick, & Neptune, 2015; Helms & Jacobs, 2002; Johnson, 2005, 2006; 
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Johnson et al., 2008; Kautt, 2002; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004; Wooldredge, 2007; 
Wooldredge & Thistlewaite, 2004). Recent research on both immigration and sentencing 
commonly draw on the minority threat perspective. The minority threat perspective 
asserts that as the size of a minority population increases, the majority feels threatened 
and deploys social control to minimize perceived threat. Despite the common themes 
running through both immigration and sentencing research, the two have rarely 
intersected. On the one hand, immigration literature has provided rich descriptions of 
how the recent wave in immigration has led to moral panic and increasingly punitive 
attitudes toward immigrants particularly in new immigrant destinations, but quantitative 
assessments have been lacking. On the other hand, sentencing research has investigated 
how the racial and ethnic composition of federal district courts affects equality in the 
administration of justice, but studies on contextual disparity within immigration cases 
have been scarce.  
Accordingly, the purpose of the present study is to merge immigration and 
sentencing literature by empirically examining how immigrant and ethnic composition 
affect the federal court processing of immigration cases. Courtroom actors in districts 
with a large or growing immigrant population may be influenced by the increasing 
punitiveness toward immigrants of color in their handling of immigration cases, thus 
resulting in unequal treatment of defendants according to district. Furthermore, the 
district-level size of the Latino or foreign-born population may interact with the race and 
ethnicity of individual defendants to amplify more severe treatment of immigrants of 
color within immigration cases. To this end, the present study draws on the minority 
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threat and courts as communities perspectives to develop hypotheses. Empirical analysis 
then examines whether foreign-born population size and Hispanic population size 
increase the likelihood of punitive outcomes for defendants in immigration cases and 
whether foreign-born population size and Hispanic population size interact with ethnicity, 
respectively, to increase severity in punishment for Hispanic defendants in immigration 
cases.  
Theoretical Framework 
The minority threat perspective is part of the broader conflict perspective 
paradigm that views the level of social control in an area as a product of perceived threat 
from economically, culturally, or racially dissimilar groups (Liska, 1992). Blalock (1967) 
developed the minority threat perspective and the mechanisms of perceived threat posed 
from racial and ethnic minority groups. He posited that the majority group may perceive 
minority outsiders as a threat to their political power and economic resources (Blalock, 
1967). Accordingly, minority threat becomes most imminent as the minority group grows 
in size and is perceived, by the majority, to encroach upon whites’ economic capital and 
political power. As a result, the majority group may employ social control to minimize 
perceived threat (Blalock, 1967), and the criminal justice system has become a primary 
form of social control (Blalock, 1967; see also Liska, 1992; Stults & Baumer, 2007). 
While Blalock (1967) was mostly concerned with economic and political threat during 
the political turmoil of the 1960s, minority threat scholars later observed that “law and 
order” politics in the 1980s and 1990s renewed and amplified stereotypes of racial and 
ethnic minorities as criminally prone (Crawford, Chiricos, & Kleck, 1998; Jackson 1989). 
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Therefore, perceived criminal threat has also been included as a type of threat that 
activates greater levels of social control in an area.  
Not only did Blalock (1967) develop the mechanisms of perceived threat on social 
control, he also argued that the functional form of the relationship between perceived 
threat and social control would vary by the type of threat. He asserted that both economic 
and political threat would have a curvilinear relationship with social control, but 
economic threat would have a decelerating relationship whereas political threat would 
have an accelerating effect. Blalock argued that economic threat is characterized by a 
decelerating relationship because informal social control, such as workplace 
discrimination and exclusion, begins to marginalize the targeted minority group, thereby 
reducing the need to employ formal social control. On the other hand, Blalock asserted 
that political threat should have an accelerating effect where increments of social control 
become higher as levels of threat increase because the majority group will respond with 
escalating mobilization to maintain dominance. Other minority threat scholars have 
argued that as a minority population increases, social control also increases until the size 
of the minority population eclipses the predominant majority group and gains more 
political and economic strength (Jackson & Carroll, 1981; Jacobs, Carmichael, & Kent, 
2005). Beyond examining functional form, recent research on the minority threat 
perspective has also emphasized the importance in distinguishing stable levels of 
minority threat from changes in minority threat, observing that changes in threat may be 
more pronounced than static levels of threat (Liska, 1992; Wang & Mears, 2010b).  
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Minority Threat and Immigration  
Immigration scholars have documented how periods of immigrant population 
growth have fueled perceptions of immigrant threat (Calavita, 1996; Chavez, 2013; 
Stewart, Martinez, Baumer, & Gertz, 2015). Throughout history, perceived immigrant 
threat has resulted in a backlash toward both documented and undocumented immigrants 
manifested in policies aimed at restricting, criminalizing, and enforcing immigration 
violations (Chavez, 2013). During the most recent wave of Latino immigration beginning 
in the 1980s and extending through the early 2000s, nationwide policies (e.g. Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and Antiterrorist and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)) broadened the number of civil immigration 
violations also considered criminal offenses and attached civil sanctions to a number of 
criminal offenses. In addition, the federal government granted local and state law 
enforcement more authority in policing immigration (Stumpf, 2006).  
The recent wave of Latino immigration also coincided with several national 
security crises which the federal government scapegoated onto undocumented Latino 
immigrants leading to the view of undocumented Latino immigrants as a national security 
threat (Chacon, 2007; Chavez, 2013; Welch, 2012). Therefore, national political rhetoric 
has focused on the necessity of convicting and expelling “criminal illegal aliens” 
(Chavez, 2013). Consequently, the Bush Administration established the Department of 
Homeland Security and allocated extensive government resources to the enforcement of 
immigration especially along the U.S.-Mexico border. Undocumented Latino immigrants 
have been the main targets, but documented immigrants and Hispanic citizens have also 
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been stereotyped and adversely affected by the punitive rhetoric and targeted 
enforcement (Chavez, 2013; Roman, 2000).  
Although perceived threat toward undocumented immigrants has increased 
nationwide in response to the recent wave of Latino immigration and terroristic incidents, 
the intensity of perceived threat and punitive action toward undocumented Latino 
immigrants also varies locally according to the size of and growth in the immigrant and 
Latino populations. To give some background, with the recent wave of immigration, 
Latino immigrants have ventured into new destination areas - outside of the traditional 
receiving areas (Singer, 2004). This is due to three primary factors 1) saturation of 
traditional receiving areas and stagnation of employment in ethnic enclaves, 2) greater 
opportunities outside the enclave in the meatpacking industry, and 3) tighter enforcement 
along the U.S.-Mexico border where immigrants traditionally cross (see Durand, Massey, 
& Charvet, 2000; Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013; Reid, Weis, Adelman, & Jaret, 2005; 
Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010a, b; Ulmer, Harris, & Steffensmeier, 2012). Immigration 
scholars have reported how new destinations with a rapidly growing immigrant or Latino 
population have employed some of the harshest policies toward undocumented 
immigrants (Chin & Miller, 2011; Kim, 2010; Michaud, 2010; Rodriguez, 2008; 
Varsanyi, 2010). For example, Longazel (2016) describes how perceived Latino threat 
gave rise to Hazleton, Pennsylvania’s Illegal Immigration Relief Ordinance (IIRO) – an 
ordinance that restricted immigrants from living and working in Hazelton. Racialized 
justifications for the IIRO linked Latino immigrants to crime, economic competition, and 
tax burden.  
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Indeed, empirical research has linked perceived threat, punitive attitudes, and the 
size and growth of the immigrant or Latino population. Stewart and colleagues (2015) 
found that Latino population growth increased punitive Latino sentiment and that 
punitive Latino sentiment was more pronounced in areas experiencing a rapid growth in 
the Latino population. Similarly, Stupi, Chiricos, and Gertz (2016) found that punitive 
attitudes toward undocumented immigrants are partially a function of change in percent 
Latino, and perceived criminal threat from undocumented immigrants mediates this 
relationship. Chiricos, Stupi, Stults, and Gertz (2014) found that support for social control 
targeting undocumented immigrants is a function of increased Latino contact, and this 
relationship is mediated by perceived economic and cultural threat. Last, Wang (2012) 
found that perceived size of the undocumented immigrant population increased 
perceptions of undocumented immigrants as criminal threats; however, the actual or 
objective size of the immigration population did not necessarily influence this 
relationship. 
Minority Threat and Sentencing 
Sentencing scholars have long documented how courtroom actors do not act in 
isolation but are influenced by other actors in the court process and through the social and 
political environment in which they work (Ulmer, 1997). Eisentstein, Fleming, and 
Nardulli (1999) advanced the framework of courts as communities by qualitatively 
describing how decision making and legal practices vary between courts. Courts develop 
their own practices based on the local legal culture, which in turn is formed through 
courtroom actors’ interactions with the surrounding political and social context and 
84 
 
among members of the courtroom workgroup consisting of judges, prosecutors, and 
defense attorneys.  
In the past two decades, methodological advancements in multilevel modeling 
have prompted sentencing researchers to identify environmental factors that influence 
sentencing decisions and the presence of racial and ethnic disparity in sentencing. The 
minority threat perspective has played a predominant role in this research. Sentencing 
scholars have tested the minority threat perspective by assessing whether minority 
population size has facilitated harsher treatment in various courts and sentencing 
outcomes. In addition, sentencing scholars have examined whether racial and ethnic 
disparity between districts can be amplified by black and Hispanic population size. For 
example, Ulmer and Johnson (2004) argued that blacks and Hispanics in areas with 
higher levels of threat may be viewed as representatives of a class of “dangerous 
offenders” and thus face tougher sentencing than whites (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004: 145). 
The findings from this research are mixed (Ulmer, 2012). While some studies 
have found a significant effect between minority population size and punitive sanctions 
for all defendants (Britt, 2000; Weidner, Frase, & Schultz, 2005) or for black and 
Hispanic defendants in particular (Bontrager, Bales, & Chiricos, 2005; Johnson, 2005; 
Johnson et al., 2008; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004), other studies have found no significant 
relationship (Fearn, 2005; Kautt, 2002; Weidner & Frase, 2003; Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 
2011; Helms & Jacobs, 2002). The mixed findings have led to a call for a more nuanced 
approach to testing the minority threat perspective, such as, accounting for nonlinearity, 
separating types of threat, and examining changes in threat (Ulmer, 2012; Wang & 
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Mears, 2010a, 2010b). Indeed, studies have found empirical support for a more nuanced 
approach. For instance, Wang and Mears (2010a) found that political threat and size of 
the minority population increased more punitive sentencing while economic threat had 
little effect on sentencing practices. In addition, prior studies have demonstrated the 
importance of examining changes in minority threat, but they revealed mixed findings 
associated with the static levels of threat. Whereas some studies have found that both 
static and dynamic measures of minority threat exhibited independent effects (e.g. 
Caravelis, Chiricos, & Bales, 2011), other studies reported that absolute change was the 
only predictor of social control in an area (e.g. Golden, 2012; Johnson, Stewart, Pickett, 
Bratton, & Gertz, 2011), and Wang and Mears (2010b) found that the two were 
interdependent.  
While a body of research has examined how racial and ethnic context influence 
sentencing practices, less research has applied the minority threat perspective to 
immigrant context and sentencing. One study by Feldmeyer, Warren, Siennick, and 
Neptune (2015) examined the link between immigrant threat and sentencing. The authors 
found evidence of racial threat for black defendants but no evidence that immigrant 
concentration had any effect on sentencing practices. Although current literature has been 
mixed, perceptions of offender blameworthiness and dangerousness may be particularly 
salient for immigration offenders. Jurisdictions with a growing number of immigrants 
may be more punitive toward defendants charged with offenses directly related to the size 
of the immigrant population (e.g., illegal entry and reentry). Moreover, because of the 
racialized undertones of punitive rhetoric, immigrants of color may be handled more 
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punitively compared to white immigrants. Therefore, the present study merges minority 
threat literature on immigration and sentencing to examine whether immigrant 
concentration and ethnic threat influence courts and sentencing outcomes within 
immigration cases and for Hispanic noncitizens within immigration cases.  
Minority Threat and the Federal Court Processing of Immigration Cases 
The federal court system is unique in several ways compared to state courts. Most 
relevant to the present study is that federal district courts cover a large geographic area 
(Shermer & Johnson, 2010). Some scholars have raised concerns over studying inter-
district variation in federal courts due to the large unit of analysis and to the fact that the 
federal sentencing guidelines are applicable to all courts (Johnson et al., 2008; Kautt, 
2002). For example, the federal court system is structured with 94 federal district courts 
at the bottom, nested within 12 circuit courts in the middle, and the Supreme Court at the 
top, and federal district courts may cover an entire state (e.g. Arizona) (see 
www.uscourt.gov). Nevertheless, Kautt (2002) describes how some policies and 
procedures are set forth by individual circuit courts, but the majority are decided at the 
bottom by individual federal district courts. Because of the decentralized nature of the 
federal court system, district courts are vulnerable to the surrounding context (Kautt, 
2002, see also Farrell & Ward, 2011).  
Regarding immigration cases, practices vary rather dramatically between federal 
district courts in several aspects. First, depending on the district, a bail hearing may be 
held for individual defendants or for a group of defendants; however, districts may have 
stringent requirements, such as paying in cash, or deny bail to noncitizens all together 
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(Chin, 2011; Eagly, 2010). Second, only certain districts have an early disposition 
program. Until 2012 when early disposition programs were approved nationwide (Cole, 
2012), the Attorney General was invested with the authority to implement an early 
disposition program based on constraints the court faced (McClellan & Sands, 2006). 
McClellan and Sands (2006) describe how this discretion resulted in vastly different 
sentence lengths for the same offense based solely on the district in which the defendant 
was sentenced. Third, district courts also vary in the role that courtroom actors play in 
deciding cases. In some districts, magistrate judges outnumber district judges, and 
magistrate judges and officials from the Department of Homeland Security decide the 
majority of immigration cases (Eagly, 2010). As noted previously, the process of electing 
magistrate judges is more political, which may make them more vulnerable to the 
surrounding social context. Fourth, some districts restrict noncitizens from alternative 
programs (e.g. probation or work release) leaving prison as the only sanction type 
available for defendants convicted of immigration offenses (Chin, 2011). Indeed, a recent 
study has found that ethnic disparity within immigration cases exists between districts. 
Specifically, Hartley and Tillyer (2012) examined differences in sentencing outcomes 
between the five Southwest border districts, and found that two of the districts gave 
significantly harsher sentences to Hispanic defendants.  
To my knowledge, only one study has examined whether district-level context 
partially accounts for variation in how immigration cases are handled between districts. 
Tillyer and Hartley (2016) reported that district-level use of fast-track departures affected 
sentence length while prosecutorial and judicial caseloads had no significant impact on 
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sentencing. Although Tillyer and Hartley did not directly test immigrant or ethnic threat, 
their findings indicate that context influences decision making in immigration cases and 
can partially explain inter-district variation. Accordingly, the present study builds on 
previous immigration and sentencing literature by focusing on whether ethnic and 
immigrant compositions influence the severity of punishment for immigration offenders 
at case filing, presentence detention, early disposition, charge reduction, guideline 
departure, and sentence length. Furthermore, the present study assesses the interaction 
between ethnic and immigrant threat measures and ethnicity to see whether punitiveness 
is targeted toward Hispanic defendants.  
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1:  Defendants processed for immigration offenses in federal districts with a 
larger Hispanic and foreign-born population will be treated more harshly at multiple 
stages of the court process. Nevertheless, the relationship between the Hispanic and 
foreign-born population size and severity in court outcomes will be curvilinear in 
nature, such that once the Hispanic and foreign-born population reaches a threshold 
or tipping point, the outcomes will diminish in severity.  
Hypothesis 1a: Defendants in districts with a larger Hispanic or foreign- 
born population size will be more likely to have their cases filed in district court until 
the size of the Hispanic and foreign-born populations reaches a critical threshold 
where the likelihood of having a case filed in district court will diminish.  
Hypothesis 1b: Defendants in districts with a larger Hispanic or foreign-born population 
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will be more likely to be detained prior to sentencing until the size of the Hispanic 
and foreign-born populations reaches a critical threshold where the likelihood of 
being detained will diminish.  
Hypothesis 1c: Defendants in districts with a larger Hispanic or foreign-born 
population will be less likely to receive early disposition until the size of the Hispanic  
and foreign-born populations reaches a critical threshold where the likelihood of 
being detained will diminish.  
Hypothesis 1d: Defendants in districts with a larger Hispanic and foreign- 
born population will be less likely to receive a charge reduction until the size of the 
Hispanic and foreign-born populations reaches a critical threshold where the 
likelihood in charge reduction will diminish.  
Hypothesis 1e: Defendants in districts with a larger Hispanic and foreign- 
born population will be less likely to receive a guideline departure until the size of the 
Hispanic and foreign-born populations reaches a critical threshold where the 
likelihood of guideline departure will diminish.  
Hypothesis 1f: Lastly, defendants in districts with a larger Hispanic and foreign- 
born population will receive a lengthier sentence until the size of the Hispanic and 
foreign-born populations reaches a critical threshold where the likelihood of 
guideline departure will diminish.   
Hypothesis 2: Defendants processed for immigration cases in federal districts with a 
larger growth in the size of the Hispanic and foreign-born populations will receive 
harsher outcomes at each stage of the federal court process.  
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Hypothesis 2a: Defendants in districts with a larger growth in the size of the Hispanic 
and foreign-born populations will be more likely to have their cases filed in district 
court.  
Hypothesis 2b: Defendants in districts with a larger growth in the size of the Hispanic 
and foreign-born populations will be more likely to be detained. 
Hypothesis 2c: Defendants in districts with a larger growth in the size of the Hispanic 
and foreign-born populations will be less likely to receive early disposition.  
Hypothesis 2d: Defendants in districts with a larger growth in the size of the Hispanic 
and foreign-born populations will be less likely to receive a charge reduction.  
Hypothesis 2e: Defendants in districts with a larger growth in the size of the Hispanic 
and foreign-born populations will be less likely to receive a guideline departure.  
Hypothesis 2f: Defendants in districts with a larger growth in the size of the Hispanic 
and foreign-born populations will be more likely to receive a lengthier sentence.   
Hypothesis 3: The size of the Hispanic and foreign-born population will interact with a 
defendant’s ethnicity to amplify severity of treatment for Hispanic defendants 
processed for immigration offenses compared to their white non-Hispanic 
counterparts.  
Hypothesis 3a: Hispanic defendants in federal districts with larger 
Hispanic and foreign-born populations will be more likely to be detained prior to 
sentencing.  
Hypothesis 3b: Hispanic defendants in federal districts with larger Hispanic and foreign 
born populations will be less likely to receive early disposition.  
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Hypothesis 3c: Hispanic defendants in federal districts with larger Hispanic and foreign- 
born populations will be less likely to receive a charge reduction.  
Hypothesis 3d: Hispanic defendants in federal districts with larger Hispanic and foreign 
born populations will be less likely to receive a guideline departure.  
Hypothesis 3e: Hispanic defendants in federal districts with larger Hispanic and foreign- 
born populations will receive a lengthier sentence.  
Hypothesis 4: In federal district courts with a greater increase in the size of the Hispanic 
and foreign-born populations, harsher treatment will be magnified for Hispanic 
defendants processed for immigration offenses.  
Hypothesis 4a: Specifically, Hispanic defendants in districts with a greater increase in 
the size of the Hispanic and foreign-born populations will be more likely to be 
detained prior to sentencing.  
Hypothesis 4b: Hispanic defendants in districts with a greater increase in the size of the 
Hispanic and foreign-born populations will be less likely to be granted early 
disposition.  
Hypothesis 4c: Hispanic defendants in districts with a greater increase in 
the size of the Hispanic and foreign-born populations will be less likely to receive a 
charge reduction.  
Hypothesis 4d: Hispanic defendants in districts with a greater increase in 
the size of the Hispanic and foreign-born populations will be less likely to be given a 
guideline departure.  
Hypothesis 4e: Hispanic defendants in districts with a greater increase in 
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the size of the Hispanic and foreign-born populations will receive a lengthier 
sentence.  
Data and Methods 
The present study uses data at both the individual and district levels. The 
individual-level data are drawn from the Federal Justice Statistics Program (FJSP) data 
series for a cohort of defendants arrested in years 2004 through 2010. The FJSP is 
particularly opportune for studying social context because it covers immigration 
defendants processed in 94 U.S. federal districts allowing for sufficient variation between 
districts.  
Contextual-level data were pulled from multiple county-based sources. 
Specifically, ethnic and foreign-born composition and pertinent social structural 
characteristics were extracted from the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Census. Political election 
data were gathered from Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, and crime rates were 
obtained from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Finally, judicial information and court 
size came from the National Judicial Center. The county-level data were then aggregated 
to the district level, and once aggregated, the contextual-level data were then merged to 
the FJSP using district identifiers.  
Dependent Variables 
 The influence of ethnic and immigrant threat are examined on six decision points 
consisting of the decision to file a case in a magistrate or a district court, presentence 
detention, charge reduction, early disposition, guideline departure, and sentence length. 
Please refer to Chapter 2 for a detailed description of each dependent variable.   
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Independent Variables 
The key contextual variables are levels and changes in ethnic and immigrant 
threat. Levels of ethnic and immigrant threat reflect the percent Hispanic and the percent 
foreign-born in each district in 2010. A quadratic term for both percent Hispanic and 
percent foreign born is added to assess the possibility of a curvilinear relationship 
between ethnic and immigrant threat and federal court decision points. Absolute changes 
in ethnic and immigrant threat measure district-level changes in percent Hispanic and 
percent foreign-born that were computed by taking the difference between each district’s 
ethnic and immigrant composition from 2000 to 2010 (see Wang & Mears, 2010b). For 
cross-level interactions, a dummy variable is included for Hispanic defendants (1 = 
Hispanic, 0 = white non-Hispanic). 16  
Contextual-level control variables. The increased focus on multilevel 
sentencing research in the past two decades has brought to light several important 
contextual factors that may affect courtroom decision making (see Helms and Jacobs, 
2002; Johnson, Ulmer, & Kramer, 2008; Kautt, 2002; Myers & Talarico, 1986; Ulmer & 
Johnson, 2004; Wang & Mears, 2010a, 2010b). Specifically, conservative political 
context is controlled for through the district percentage that voted for McCain in 2008. A 
measure is also created for resource deprivation that consists of percent below poverty, 
percent receiving public assistance, percent unemployed in civilian populations above 16 
years old, per capita income, median household income, and median family income. In 
addition, the average UCR index crime rate in a district is used to control for the possible 
                                                          
16 Hispanic defendants are not further separated into white Hispanic and black Hispanic because there are 
not enough black Hispanic defendants in each district to conduct cross-level interactions.   
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impact that district-level crime rates may have on decision making, and two variables are 
constructed to measure court size and caseload rate. Court size is controlled for through 
the average number of authorized judges in the district from 2004 through 2010. Court 
caseload rate is then computed by dividing the average number of criminal cases for the 
same period of time by the average number of authorized judges in a district. Last, a 
dummy variable that captures whether the district contains an early disposition/fast-track 
program is added to the analysis. A number of individual-level control variables were 
also included and are described in depth in Chapter 2. Please refer to Chapter 2.  
Analytic Strategy 
Hierarchical generalized linear modeling (HGLM) in HLM 7.0 was used for the 
analysis which accounts for the nested nature of the data where individual defendants are 
at level one, and districts are at level two. Individual- and district-level predictors are 
grand-mean centered to assess the effect of ethnic and immigrant composition on federal 
court outcomes (Baumer & Martin, 2013). The analysis then proceeds in three stages. 
First, the main effects of levels of ethnic and immigrant threat on the six dependent 
variables of interest are examined. Second, the main effects for absolute change of ethnic 
and immigrant threat are assessed for each outcome. Third, cross-level interactions 
between ethnic and immigrant threat and ethnicity are conducted for each decision point 
from presentence detention to sentence length on a subsample of randomly selected 
Hispanic defendants.17 For the cross-level interactions, black and Asian defendants are 
removed from analysis because there are too few within each district.  
                                                          
17 Because Hispanic defendants comprise over 90% of immigration offenders, I conduct a random 20% 
sample of Hispanic defendants so white non-Hispanic defendants could serve as the reference category 
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Results 
 Table 11 displays the descriptive statistics for variables pulled from the USMS 
and EOUSA data, and Table 12 displays the descriptive statistics for the AOUSC and 
USSC data. Before turning to the results, percent foreign-born had no significant effects 
at any stage in the court process, thus the following section only includes the results for 
ethnic composition. For parsimony, the tables present district-level variables; however, 
all individual-level controls were also included in each model. The models for Hispanic 
population size and the absolute change in percent Hispanic were run separately due to 
collinearity.   
 
                                                          
when examining cross-level interaction effects. It should be noted that the USMS and EOUSA which are 
used to investigate case filing decisions do not contain information on ethnicity. Accordingly, the random 
sample of Hispanic defendants was drawn for the remaining outcomes which are based on the AOUSC and 
USSC data. 
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Hypothesis 1 
 Hypothesis 1a: Case Filing. The analysis begins by examining the effects of 
percent Hispanic and percent Hispanic squared on case filing decisions. The results are 
displayed in Table 13 Model 1. Hispanic population size has no linear or curvilinear 
effect on case filing decisions, thus lending no support for Hypothesis 1a at this stage in 
the court process.  
 Hypothesis 1b: Presentence Detention. The results of Hispanic population size 
on presentence detention are presented in Table 14 Model 1. The results indicate that 
percent Hispanic has a significant relationship with presentence detention. Specifically, 
percent Hispanic increases the likelihood of presentence detention (b = .063, p < 0.05), 
but this relationship is curvilinear in nature where the effect of percent Hispanic on use of 
detention levels off once the Hispanic population reaches a threshold (b = -.182, p < 
0.05). The findings support Hypothesis 1b at presentence detention.  
Hypothesis 1c: Early Disposition. Next, the effects of percent Hispanic and its 
quadratic term are investigated for early disposition. Table 15 Model 1 shows that percent 
Hispanic has a significant linear effect on early disposition (b = .201, p < 0.05). Contrary 
to Hypothesis 1c, percent Hispanic exhibits a positive relationship with early disposition. 
Early disposition is employed more frequently in districts with a larger Hispanic 
population size. 
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 Hypothesis 1d: Charge Reduction. Table 16 Model 1 reveals that percent 
Hispanic and percent Hispanic squared exhibit no significant relationship with charge 
reduction. Hypothesis 1d is not supported at this stage in the federal court process.  
Hypothesis 1e: Guideline Departure. The results for guideline departure can be 
viewed in Tables 17 through 19 Model 1. As with charge reduction, no significant effect 
of Hispanic population size emerges for downward departure, substantial assistance 
departure, or other government assistance departure. Accordingly, no support for 
Hypothesis 1e exists at guideline departure.  
 Hypothesis 1f: Sentence Length. Table 20 Model 1 displays the effects of 
percent Hispanic and its quadratic term on sentence length. Neither percent Hispanic nor 
percent Hispanic squared has a statistically significant relationship with sentence length, 
thus no support is found for Hypothesis 1f at sentencing.  
Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2a: Case filing. Following the analysis for Hispanic population size, 
the effects of absolute change in percent Hispanic from 2000 to 2010 are investigated for 
the same six outcomes. Table 13 Model 2 suggests that no statistically significant 
relationship exists between absolute change and case filing decisions. Accordingly, 
Hypothesis 2a is not supported at this stage.  
 Hypothesis 2b: Presentence Detention. Similar to case filing, Table 14 Model 2 
demonstrates that absolute change in percent Hispanic has no statistically significant  
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impact on presentence detention. Therefore, Hypothesis 2b is not supported at 
presentence detention. 
Hypothesis 2c: Early Disposition. Turning to Table 15 Model 2, absolute change 
in percent Hispanic is significantly related to the likelihood of receiving early disposition 
(b = .377, p < 0.05). Defendants are more likely to receive early disposition with an 
absolute increase in percent Hispanic. This finding is opposite of Hypothesis 2c but  
consistent with the previous finding for Hypothesis 1c that examined the effects of 
Hispanic population size on early disposition.   
 Hypothesis 2d: Charge Reduction. Inspection of Table 16 Model 2 reveals that 
absolute change in percent Hispanic does not influence whether charges are reduced, thus 
there is no support for Hypothesis 2d at charge reduction.  
 Hypothesis 2e: Guideline Departure. Likewise, Model 2 in Tables 17 through 
19 indicate that absolute change in percent Hispanic does not affect downward departure, 
substantial assistance departure, or other government assistant departure suggesting no 
support for Hypothesis 2e at guideline departure.  
 Hypothesis 2f: Sentence Length. Last, absolute change in percent Hispanic has 
no statistically significant relationship with length of sentence. Accordingly, Hypothesis 
2f is not supported at sentence length.  
Hypothesis 3 
 Hypothesis 3a: Presentence Detention. In the following section, cross-level 
interactions between Hispanic population size and Hispanic ethnicity are examined to 
determine whether Hispanic defendants receive more severe sanctions in districts with a 
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large Hispanic population. No significant interaction effect is detected in Table 14 Model 
3, suggesting no support for Hypothesis 3a at presentence detention.  
 Hypothesis 3b: Early Disposition. Investigation of Table 15 Model 3 
demonstrates that there is no significant interaction between percent Hispanic or its 
quadratic term with Hispanic ethnicity. No support for Hypothesis 3b exists at early 
disposition.  
 Hypothesis 3c: Charge Reduction. Table 16 Model 3 presents the results for the 
interactions between percent Hispanic and ethnicity and percent Hispanic squared and 
ethnicity. Hypothesis 3c is not supported at charge reduction as there is no statistically 
significant relationship between Hispanic population size and charge reduction.  
 Hypothesis 3d: Guideline Departure. Similar to all previous models testing 
Hypothesis 3, Tables 17 through 19 indicate that percent Hispanic and percent Hispanic 
squared do not significantly influence whether Hispanic defendants receive a guideline 
departure. Therefore, Hypothesis 3d is not supported at the guideline departure.   
 Hypothesis 3e: Sentence Length. Table 20 Model 3 shows that percent Hispanic 
exerts no statistically linear or curvilinear relationship with sentence length. Overall, no 
support is found for Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 4 
 Hypothesis 4a: Presentence Detention. Finally, cross-level interactions between 
absolute change in percent Hispanic and Hispanic ethnicity are conducted to determine 
whether Hispanic defendants receive harsher treatment in districts with a greater absolute 
change in percent Hispanic. Table 14 Model 4 demonstrates that the absolute change in 
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percent Hispanic does significantly impact presentence detention; however, the direction 
is contrary to Hypothesis 4. As percent Hispanic increases, Hispanic defendants are less 
likely to be detained. Figure 4 presents the interaction between absolute change in percent 
Hispanic and Hispanic ethnicity. The figure reports the likelihood of receiving detention 
by ethnicity and three levels of absolute change in percent Hispanic (one standard 
deviation below mean, at mean, and one standard deviation above mean). For non-
Hispanic white defendants, presentence detention is less likely at one standard deviation 
below mean absolute change in percent Hispanic and more likely when absolute change 
in percent Hispanic is one standard deviation above the mean. Conversely, for Hispanic 
defendants, detention is more likely at one standard deviation below mean absolute 
change in percent Hispanic and less likely when absolute change in percent Hispanic is 
one standard deviation above the mean. That said, the differences in predicted 
probabilities of receiving a presentence detention across these three levels are relatively 
small. 
Hypothesis 4b: Early Disposition. Table 15 Model 4 reveals no support for 
Hypothesis 4b at early disposition. Absolute change in percent Hispanic does not 
significantly influence the effect of Hispanic ethnicity on the likelihood of receiving early 
disposition.  
Hypothesis 4c: Charge Reduction. Inspection of Table 16 Model 4 indicates that 
the interaction between absolute change in percent Hispanic and Hispanic ethnicity is not 
statistically significant at charge reduction, thus no support is found for Hypothesis 4c.  
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Figure 4: Likelihood of Presentence Detention by Ethnicity at Three Levels of Absolute 
Change in Hispanic Population Growth 
 
Hypothesis 4d: Guideline Departure. Turning to guideline departure, Tables 17 
through 19 Model 4 displays the interaction between absolute change in percent Hispanic 
and Hispanic ethnicity on downward departure, substantial assistance departure, and 
other government assistance departure. The results reveal that the absolute change in 
percent Hispanic significantly influences whether Hispanic defendants receive a 
downward departure compared to white non-Hispanic defendants. The findings are 
opposite to Hypothesis 4d. Figure 5 displays the relationship between absolute change in 
percent Hispanic and Hispanic ethnicity. At one standard deviation above the mean 
absolute change in percent Hispanic, Hispanic defendants are more likely to receive a 
downward departure than white non-Hispanic defendants. Further investigation of Figure  
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Figure 5a: Likelihood of Receiving a Downward Departure by Ethnicity at Three Levels 
of Absolute Change in Hispanic Population Growth  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5b: Likelihood of Receiving a Substantial Assistance Departure by Ethnicity at 
Three Levels of Absolute Change in Hispanic Population Growth 
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Figure 5c: Likelihood of Receiving a Government Assistance Departure by Ethnicity at 
Three Levels of Absolute Change in Hispanic Population Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5a reveals that the gap in the likelihood of receiving a downward departure between 
Hispanic defendants and white non-Hispanic defendants is reduced at mean absolute 
change in percent Hispanic. At one standard deviation below mean absolute change in 
percent Hispanic, there is no difference in the likelihood of receiving a downward 
departure between Hispanic defendants and white non-Hispanic defendants.  
With respect to substantial assistance and other government sponsored departures, 
absolute change in percent Hispanic has no significant effect on Hispanic ethnicity. 
Hypothesis 4d is not supported at guideline departure. 
Hypothesis 4e: Sentence length. Table 20 displays the interaction between 
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statistically significant relationship emerges between absolute change and ethnicity. 
Hypothesis 4e is not supported at sentencing.  
Discussion 
Summary 
 The goal of the present study was to examine whether ethnic and immigrant threat 
influences federal court decision making in immigration cases. The punitive rhetoric 
surrounding criminal immigration, the harsh subfederal policies toward immigrants in 
new destination areas, and the most recent literature demonstrating that perceived threat 
and punitiveness are a function of the Hispanic and immigrant population size suggest 
that an in-depth assessment of how context influences the handling of immigration cases 
is warranted. To this end, four overarching hypotheses were developed into 22 total 
hypotheses. Limited and mixed support was found for the hypotheses with some notable 
exceptions. Hispanic population size had a curvilinear relationship with presentence 
detention where size of the Hispanic population increased the likelihood of being 
detained then leveled off, thus supporting Hypothesis 1b. By contrast, Hispanic 
population size had a direct and positive relationship with use of early disposition, which 
was opposite of what was predicted by Hypothesis 1c. No support was found for any part 
of Hypotheses 2 or 3. In fact, similar to Hypothesis 1c, absolute change in percent 
Hispanic led to an increase in early disposition contrary to what was hypothesized 
according to Hypothesis 2c. Similarly, no support was found for Hypothesis 4 although 
two significant findings emerged. Against what was proposed in Hypotheses 4a and 4d, 
Hispanic defendants were less likely to be detained and were more likely to receive a 
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downward departure in areas where there was a greater absolute change in percent 
Hispanic.  
Theoretical and Policy Implications 
 Findings from this study suggest that a modest amount of contextual disparity 
does exist in the federal court processing of immigration cases. Defendants charged with 
immigration offenses were treated more harshly or more leniently depending on the size 
or increase of the Hispanic population at presentence detention, early disposition, and 
downward departure; however, the patterns observed in this study were not always 
consistent with the minority threat perspective. While all defendants were more likely to 
receive presentence detention in districts with a larger Hispanic population size, all 
defendants were also more likely to receive early disposition in districts where percent 
Hispanic was greater and the absolute change in percent Hispanic increased. Moreover, 
the interactions between Hispanic ethnicity and absolute change in percent Hispanic 
indicated that Hispanic defendants were treated more leniently than white non-Hispanic 
defendants where there was a larger increase in percent Hispanic.  
The reason the main effect of ethnic threat is salient to presentence detention and 
no other decision point may reflect the primary concern of decision makers at this stage 
of the court process. For example, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides guidelines for 
presentence release. The factors to be considered are the nature and circumstances of the 
offense charged, the weight of evidence against the person, the history and characteristics 
of the person, and the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the 
community that would be posed by the person’s release (Bail Reform Act, 1984). While 
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legal factors, such as offense type and seriousness determine whether the first 
requirements are met, the magistrate judge holds the discretion to decide whether the 
defendant poses a danger to the community. Relying on factors like the person’s criminal 
history, characteristics, and dangerousness to the community may bring perceptions of 
threat to the forefront of decisions. Accordingly, factors that influence perceptions of 
threat, such as ethnic composition, may be particularly germane to detention decisions 
compared to other decision points. In addition, the appointment process of federal 
magistrate judges is more political than that of U.S. attorneys and judges, which may 
open the federal magistrate up to outside influences (McCabe, 2014). Moreover, it may 
be that federal magistrate judges are only selected if they are known to reflect the views 
of the district.  
 By contrast, the finding that early disposition is more likely in districts where 
percent Hispanic is larger is opposite of what the minority threat perspective would 
predict. Instead, the linear term suggests early disposition may be used to address 
constraints on the court. In fact, early disposition programs were created for handling 
large numbers of immigration cases. With the passage of the PROTECT Act in 2003, 
Congress officially approved early disposition programs in select districts where the U.S. 
Attorney could demonstrate that the program would save the government significant 
resources (McClellan & Sands, 2006). Relatedly, the context of early disposition is 
unique because it allows for the use of deportation as part of its stipulation (Eagly, 2010), 
thus early disposition may be used more frequently in districts with a larger Hispanic 
population size because it addresses constraints on the court and is a convenient means to 
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assign to deportation. Therefore, punitiveness may be manifest in increased civil 
sanctions that are not available at other decision points, and the leniency associated with 
early disposition programs may be misleading.  
 The interaction between Hispanic ethnicity and percent Hispanic is also opposite 
of what would be suggested by the minority threat perspective. Hispanic defendants 
received more lenient treatment at presentence detention and downward departure where 
there is a larger absolute change in percent Hispanic. Some other studies have found 
similar results (see Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2011; Helms, 2009). For example, Feldmeyer 
and Ulmer (2011) examined cross-level interactions between Hispanic population size 
and defendant ethnicity and found that Hispanic defendants were treated more harshly in 
areas with a lower percent Hispanic. The authors suggested two explanations. On the one 
hand, perceived cultural differences according to ethnicity may be amplified when there 
are fewer Hispanic residents in an area. As the Hispanic population grows in size, 
perceived cultural differences between Hispanics and whites may lessen. On the other 
hand, courtroom actors may become concerned with political and social backlash by 
targeting members of a growing minority population.  
Relatedly, another reason for the more lenient treatment of Hispanic defendants in 
districts with a greater absolute change in percent Hispanic may be the lack of controls 
for baseline levels of threat due to collinearity between the measures. If absolute change 
in percent Hispanic is occurring more frequently in districts that already have a large 
Hispanic population, then an increase in the Hispanic population may indicate that a 
critical threshold has been reached where Hispanics have more power and economic 
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influence, thus resulting in more lenient treatment of Hispanic defendants as Hispanic 
population size increases.  
Directions for Future Research 
The results from the present study bring up three necessary areas for future 
research. The first is an empirical examination of how the criminal justice and civil 
immigration systems work together. The need for a joint investigation of both systems is 
exemplified in the differential impact of ethnic composition on presentence detention as 
opposed to early disposition. Eagly (2010) describes how early disposition is used to 
facilitate deportation, but information on deportation is not available in the FJSP. 
Consequently, looking at how immigration cases are handled from the stance of the 
criminal justice system excludes the harsh civil consequences that may be enforced at 
certain decision points, such as early disposition. An empirical investigation of both the 
criminal justice and civil systems could shed light on whether districts with a large 
percentage of Hispanics are increasing the use of deportation as part of early disposition 
stipulations or whether early disposition is primarily being used to address constraints on 
the court.  
A second direction for future research is an examination of how the absolute 
change in percent Hispanic affects the handling of immigration cases when accounting 
for baseline levels of threat. Due to collinearity between baseline levels and changes, the 
present study was unable to do so; however, several studies have demonstrated the 
importance of accounting for both (e.g. Caravelis et al., 2011; Golden, 2012) and 
assessing interactions between the two (Wang & Mears, 2010b). For example, Wang and 
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Mears (2010b) found that in areas with higher baseline threat, growth in percent black 
was more likely to result in a prison sentence for all defendants. Therefore, including 
baseline levels of threat in future studies of contextual disparity and criminal immigration 
cases would help clarify the present study’s results.  
Lastly, more research is needed on immigrant concentration and sentencing in 
immigration cases. The present study found no statistically significant influence of 
percent foreign-born in any of the models. This may be due to the lower degree of 
variation in the size of the foreign born-populations across districts. In addition, percent 
foreign-born only comprised a very low percentage of the district population overall. 
Therefore, immigrant concentration on courts and sentencing outcomes may need to be 
examined at a lower level of aggregation.  
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, a large number of immigrants entered the United States in the last 
three decades and began to disperse into new destination areas (Gibson & Jung, 2006; 
Grieco et al., 2012; Pew Research Center, 2014; Singer, 2004). Recent immigration 
scholarship has drawn on the minority threat perspective to examine the impact that the 
most recent wave of immigration has had on perceived immigrant and ethnic threat and 
punitiveness toward immigrants. This literature has indicated that perceptions of threat 
posed by immigrants are more prevalent in areas within the United States characterized 
by a large or growing foreign-born or Hispanic population (Chiricos et al., 2014; Stewart 
et al., 2015; Stupi et al., 2014; Wang, 2012). Moreover, new destination areas have 
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implemented some of the most punitive policies toward immigrants (Zatz & Smith, 
2012).  
Applying this research to a comprehensive examination of the impact of ethnic 
and immigrant threat on courts and sentencing decisions, the present study found mixed 
results that depended on the stage of the courts and sentencing process. Contextual 
disparity surfaced at decision points presided over by federal magistrate judges and 
prosecutors but were not always consistent with the minority threat perspective. Overall, 
this study suggests that decision making at certain stages in the court processing of 
immigration cases is influenced by the surrounding ethnic and immigrant context, but 
more clarity is needed on why certain patterns emerged.  
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CHAPTER 4: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY WITHIN IMMIGRATION CASES 
OVER TIME 
Overview 
Research has demonstrated that punitive attitudes toward immigrants and 
immigration are partly a function of the social structure (Sobczack, 2010). Prominent 
social structural characteristics that have been found to influence punitive attitudes 
toward immigrants include economic hardships, immigrant population growth, and 
terroristic incidents (Essess, Dovidio, & Hodson, 2002; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & 
Armstrong, 2001; Quillian, 1995; Sobczack, 2010; Wang, 2012). In the past 35 years, the 
United States has experienced all three. First, a major shift in the social structure began 
when a wave of immigration in the 1980s changed the demographic composition in the 
United States (Gibson & Jung, 2006; Grieco et al., 2012). Second, the United States 
experienced several domestic terroristic incidents throughout the 1990s, then 9/11 
occurred in 2001 (Chacon, 2007). The 9/11 attacks had a lasting impact on the economy 
and on the criminal justice and immigration systems (Esses et al., 2002; Wadhia, 2010). 
Third and relatedly, an economic recession occurred in 2008 that left many in the United 
States struggling for jobs and resources (Esses et al., 2002).  
Current punitive rhetoric and policies targeting undocumented Latino immigrants 
indicate that the demographic and economic shifts, along with terroristic attacks in the 
United States, may have intensified punitive attitudes and social control toward 
undocumented Latino immigrants over the past several decades. Punitive rhetoric toward 
undocumented Hispanic immigrants has increasingly conflated ethnicity and immigration 
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status with crime and terror (Chacon, 2007; 2009; 2012). Indeed, group threat theory 
predicts that punitive attitudes and social control change across time and place (Bobo & 
Hutchings, 1996; Quillian, 1995), and longitudinal research has indicated that punitive 
attitudes fluctuate over time (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & 
Krysan, 1997). Nevertheless, longitudinal research on punitive attitudes, group threat, 
and social control targeting undocumented immigrants has been scarce and has mainly 
focused on European countries (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010).  
Accordingly, the purpose of the present paper is to assess whether Hispanic 
noncitizens who are defendants in immigration cases are sentenced more harshly over 
time compared to white noncitizens, and whether ethnic disparity within immigration 
cases over time is exacerbated in areas with the greatest increase in Hispanic population 
growth. Incarceration and sentencing practices have been a main source of social control 
over undocumented immigrants alongside deportation (Eagly, 2010), and the increased 
punitive stance toward undocumented immigrants in both the civil and criminal justice 
systems suggests that time may play an important role in the treatment of Latino 
noncitizens at sentencing.  
Theoretical Framework 
Group threat theory provides a framework to understand the sources of punitive 
attitudes toward Hispanic noncitizens and what causes them to change over time. Group 
threat theory contends that punitive attitudes result from concern over a group’s position 
relative to other groups in a social hierarchy (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996). Moreover, 
individual perceptions of a group’s position in the social hierarchy develop through 
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public and political rhetoric on group superiority, out-group stereotyping, rights to 
desired resources, and perceived threat to desired resources (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & 
Hutchings, 1996).  
Accordingly, punitive attitudes are highest when the outgroup is perceived to 
threaten the ingroup’s advantageous position and access to resources (King & Wheelock, 
2007). Sources of threat include the size of the outgroup’s population, economic 
conditions, and terroristic threat (Blalock, 1967; Esses et al., 2002; King & Wheelock, 
2007; Quillian, 1995). Blalock (1967) explicated how the size of minority population 
affects punitiveness. He asserted that as the size of the minority population increases, the 
dominant group will perceive two types of threats: political and economic (Blalock, 
1967). Political threat occurs because majority members feel that their political 
dominance and control is threatened as the minority group becomes more politically 
powerful with increased numbers (Blalock, 1967). Economic threat arises because 
members of the majority group perceive that their economic well-being is threatened 
through competition for jobs and economic resources as the presence of a minority 
population increases (Blalock, 1967). Later, minority threat theorists expanded the 
minority threat perspective to also include criminal threat where large numbers of a 
minority population are asserted to pose a criminal threat to majority members (Bontrager 
et al., 2005; Crawford et al., 1998; Jackson, 1989).  
Economic conditions and terrorism are other sources of perceived threat. Quillian 
(1995) explained the connection between the economy and perceived threat. When 
economic conditions worsen, the dominant group either scapegoats the blame for the 
124 
 
state of the economy onto the minority group, or they perceive the minority group as 
competition for scarce resources (Quillian, 1995). Regarding terrorism, Esses and 
colleagues (2002) describe how terroristic incidents induce extreme perceptions of threat 
to the basic preservation of the majority group. In sum, group threat theory offers an 
explanation as to why immigration, economic downturn, and terrorism in the past several 
decades have coincided with increased punitiveness toward undocumented Hispanic 
immigrants.  
Punitive Attitudes toward Undocumented Immigrants Over Time 
Although longitudinal research on punitive attitudes toward undocumented 
immigrants has been lacking, one study by Fussell (2014) compiled several decades of 
data in the United States from the General Social Survey (GSS) and found that at the 
national level, American attitudes toward immigration generally have become more 
positive over time. Nevertheless, assessing attitudes toward immigration in general is 
problematic because research has found that punitive attitudes toward immigration and 
immigrants depend on documented status and their race and ethnicity (Citrin & Sides, 
2008; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Wright, Levy, & Citrin, 2015).  
One study by Citrin and Sides (2008) found no differences between the United 
States and other European countries in attitudes toward immigration generally; when 
asked about unauthorized immigration, attitudes in the United States were decidedly 
negative. In a similar vein, Wright, Levy, and Citrin (2016) found that opinions of 
undocumented immigrants were developed differently compared to opinions formed of 
authorized immigrants; a portion of participants disregarded all undocumented 
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immigrants based on moral grounds but welcomed authorized immigrants based on 
ascribed characteristics. In another study, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) synthesized 
several studies and found a trend in the mid-1990s and after the 9/11 attacks, when 
punitive attitudes toward immigrants became focused on Hispanic noncitizens. In sum, 
attitudes in the United States toward immigration generally may have become more 
positive while punitive attitudes toward Hispanic noncitizens specifically may have 
intensified over time.   
Longitudinal Sentencing Research  
Criminal justice actors are significantly impacted by their surrounding context 
(Eisenstein et al., 1999), and a body of research has accumulated demonstrating the 
impact that levels of threat and punitiveness have on social control (D’Alessio, Eitle, & 
Stolzenberg, 2005; Eitle, D’Alessio, & Stolzenberg, 2002; Jackson & Carroll, 1981; 
Kane, 2003; Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Liska & Chamlin, 1984; Liska, Lawrence, & Benson, 
1981; Parker, Stults, & Rice, 2005; Stolzenberg, D’Alessio, & Eitle, 2004; Stults & 
Baumer, 2007). Sentencing decisions stand at the heart of the criminal justice system and 
have long been used as a method of social control through incapacitation and 
disenfranchisement (Alexander, 2012; Western, 2006). While most sentencing research 
has examined how sentencing practices vary by place (e.g. Britt, 2000; Felmeyer & 
Ulmer, 2011; Helms, 2009; Kautt, 2002; Jacobs, Carmichael, & Kent, 2005: Ulmer & 
Johnson, 2004; Wang & Mears, 2010a, 2010b), time is also important. 
Courtroom practices have been shown to vary over time (Hofer, 2007, Light, 
2014). One example is the increased use of departures during the 1990s; scholars have 
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contended that downward departures were one way to mitigate the severity of punishment 
imposed by the sentencing guidelines (Hofer, 2007). Another example is the influence of 
race in sentencing over time. Several reviews have indicated that over the past century 
racial disparity has become more indirect and institutionalized though no less harmful as 
courtroom actors are no longer able to blatantly consider race in their decision-making 
(Spohn, 2015b; Van Cleve, 2016; Zatz, 1987, 2000). Overall, longitudinal studies are 
important because they can detect trends and changes in sentencing. Otherwise, whether a 
relationship is observed between key variables of interest that fluctuates over time would 
depend on the years selected (Light, 2014). 
Although sentencing scholars have demonstrated the importance of longitudinal 
research while examining sentencing practices, such research has been scarce in 
comparison to cross-sectional sentencing research and has generally been conducted to 
examine whether racial and ethnic disparity increased after the federal sentencing 
guidelines were made advisory (e.g. Kim et al., 2016; Lynch & Omori, 2014; Ulmer et 
al., 2011a, 2011b; Starr & Rehavi, 2013; Yang, 2014, 2015). Instead, sentencing scholars 
have relied on cross-sectional methods that provide insights on sentencing practices 
during a window of time. Once enough studies have accumulated, then sentencing 
scholars assess the state of the literature and any patterns that have emerged (e.g. 
Baumer, 2013; Chiricos & Crawford, 1995; Hagan, 1974; Ulmer, 2012; Spohn, 2000, 
2015b; Zatz, 1987, 2000). While this research has significantly contributed to our 
understanding of courtroom decision making, especially in the area of inequality in the 
administration of justice, it requires an adequate number of studies to accumulate over 
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multiple years. For sentencing trends that have received little empirical examination, a 
longitudinal method is necessary to detect patterns over time.  
Because literature has indicated that punitive attitudes toward Hispanic 
noncitizens has increased over time (Chacon, 2007; Medina, 2006; Provine & Doty, 
2011; Stumpf, 2006), the influence of ethnicity within immigration cases may strengthen 
rather than weaken over time. Furthermore, the increase in ethnic disparity within 
immigration cases may be heightened in areas with the largest demographic shifts in 
ethnic composition. Indeed, two sentencing studies have indicated that in matters related 
to immigration, sentencing trends have become more punitive toward noncitizens, who 
received harsher sentences over time and in districts with the largest growth in the 
Hispanic population (Light, 2014; Light, Massoglia, & King, 2014).  
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Ethnic disparity within immigration cases will increase over time. 
Specifically, Hispanic defendants will receive longer sentence terms compared to 
similarly situated white defendants, and this disparity will increase over time.  
Hypothesis 2: Ethnic disparity within immigration cases will have a greater increase 
over time in districts that had a larger growth in the Hispanic population from 
1990 to 2010.  
Data and Methods 
The data for the present study come from the Federal Justice Statistics Program 
(FJSP) data series. Because the focus of this study is on sentence length, the United 
States Sentencing Commission portion of the FJSP is used. The FJSP is especially 
suitable for a longitudinal examination of ethnic disparity and sentencing outcomes 
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within immigration cases because it has a wealth of legal and extra-legal information that 
covers a wide span of years. After merging the data for the 18 available years (1994 
through 2012), immigration cases sentenced in federal court were culled from the full 
data set, and citizen defendants were removed because of their inadequate number for 
analysis. In addition, American Indian, black, and Asian defendants were removed 
because there were too few in each district to allow a three-level interaction. Further, 
cases in the four district territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and North 
Mariana Island were also removed along with districts that have too few immigration 
cases to carry out the three-level interaction. The final sample consists of 236,649 
defendants across 89 federal districts.  
To assess if ethnic disparity within immigration cases has increased over time in 
districts that had a larger growth in the Hispanic populations, ethnic composition was 
obtained from the 1990 and 2010 U.S. Census and was aggregated from the county-level 
to the district-level. The district-level indicators were then merged to the FJSP using 
unique district identifiers. In addition, information on control variables was gathered 
from the National Judicial Center. 
Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable is sentence severity which was fashioned after prior 
sentencing research that uses a one–stage model (Johnson & Betsinger, 2009; Kim et al., 
2014; Schanzenbach & Tiller, 2007; Starr & Rehavi, 2013; USSC, 2010). Therefore, 
sentence length was measured in months and capped at 470 months, and probation and 
alternative outcomes were incorporated as zero months. To reduce skew, sentence length 
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was logged and zero values were assigned to .01 prior to the log transformation (see 
Ferketich & Verran, 1994).  
Independent Variables 
The main independent variable is the defendant’s ethnicity which was indicated 
by a dummy variable identifying whether the defendant is Hispanic with white non-
Hispanic defendants designated as the reference category (1=Hispanic, 0=white non-
Hispanic). To assess the interaction of ethnicity with both time- and district-level factors, 
two more independent variables were included in the analysis. One variable was a 
continuous measure representing the year (1994-2012) that the defendant was sentenced 
with the year 1994 coded as “1” and the year 2012 coded as “19”. The other variable is a 
district-level indicator of the growth of the Hispanic population from 1990 to 2010 
reflecting the difference in percent Hispanic from 1990 to 2010.  
Control Variables 
To assess ethnic disparity over time, a number of individual, time varying, and 
district-level variables were included in the models based on prior longitudinal, 
contextual, and individual-level sentencing research (e.g. Kim et al., 2016; Light, 2014; 
Light et al., 2014; Starr & Rehavi, 2013; Ulmer et al., 2011a, 2011b). At the individual-
level, offense severity was measured through the presumptive guideline sentence that 
accounts for the recommended sentence length adjusting for any mandatory minimum 
trumps or enhancements (Engen & Gainey, 2000). To reduce skew, the presumptive 
guideline sentence was logged, and zero values were allocated to .01 prior to the log 
transformation (Ferketich & Verran, 1994). Because criminal history has been shown to 
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exert a unique effect beyond its consideration in the presumptive guideline, a measure for 
the six-level criminal history category was also included. In addition, offense type was 
controlled for through a set of dummy variables created for Person, Property, Drugs, 
Other, Smuggling, Fraud, and Immigration-Other offenses, with Illegal Entry/Reentry 
serving as the reference category. Illegal Entry/Reentry was not able to be separated into 
two categories as they were not tracked separately during the 1990s.  
Four other legal and case processing variables were added as controls. 
Dichotomous variables were created to capture whether the defendant was convicted of 
multiple convictions (1 = multiple convictions, 0 = single conviction) and whether the 
defendant was convicted by trial or guilty plea (1 = trial, 0 = guilty plea). Guideline 
departure was controlled for through a set of dummy variables representing downward 
departure, a government assistance/early disposition departure, and upward departure, 
with no departure assigned as the reference group. A dichotomous variable was added to 
control for whether a defendant accepted guilt. Last, demographic controls were included 
for gender and age. Gender was coded dichotomously (1 = female, 0 = male), and age 
was measured continuously in years.  
One time-varying variable was added to the cross-level analyses that investigated 
ethnic disparity over time and over time in districts with a larger growth in the Hispanic 
populations. Based on prior longitudinal sentencing work (see Helms & Jacobs, 2002; 
Johnson, Ulmer, & Kramer, 2008; Kautt, 2002; Myers & Talarico, 1986; Ulmer & 
Johnson, 2004; Wang & Mears, 2010a, b), variations in the court caseload rate was 
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calculated by dividing the number of incoming cases for each year from 1994 to 2012 by 
the number of authorized judges for each year.  
Several district-level control variables were also included. First, a variable 
reflecting average court size was computed for the average number of authorized judges 
from 1994 to 2012. Second, a variable was included for whether a case was processed in 
a Southwest border district. Last, a variable for the baseline percent Hispanic in 1990 was 
included into the three-level analysis.  
Analytic Strategy 
A three-level analysis was employed with individual defendants at level one, 
trend in years was at level two, and district-level growth in the Hispanic population at 
level three. Using hierarchical linear modeling in HLM 7.0, the analysis proceeded in 
three stages. First, using the full set of controls at the individual-level, time, and district 
level, the main effects of ethnicity were assessed. Second, cross-level interactions 
between ethnicity and trend in years were conducted to determine whether ethnic 
disparity has increased over time (see Light, Massoglia, & King, 2014). Third, a three-
way cross-level interaction was employed that included defendant ethnicity, trend in 
years, and growth in the Hispanic population from 1990 to 2012. 
Results 
 Turning to the results, the main effect of ethnicity on sentence length is displayed 
in Model 1 in Table 21. Hispanic defendants received a lengthier sentence than their 
white non-Hispanic counterparts (b = .293; p < .001) from the years 1994 through 2012. 
In addition, the main effect of trend in years is significant (b = -.101; p < .001), indicating 
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that sentence length decreased from 1994 through 2012. None of the district-level main 
effects were significant. 
Next, a cross-level interaction term is included for trend in years and Hispanic 
ethnicity to assess Hypothesis 1. Model 2 in Table 21 suggests no support for Hypothesis 
1. Ethnic disparity does not significantly increase from 1994 through 2012. Last, a three-
way cross-level interaction term is included to examine whether ethnic disparity 
increased over time in districts with the largest growth in the Hispanic population. 
Turning to Model 3 in Table 21, the interaction term among ethnicity, trend in years, and 
change in percent Hispanic is statistically significant (b = .013; p < .001); however, the 
direction of the effects is unexpected. As can be seen in Figure 6, ethnic disparity is most 
pronounced in districts with the greatest change in percent Hispanic but decreased over 
time, thus partially supporting Hypothesis 2.  
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Figure 6: Three-way Interaction Predicting Sentence Length by Trend in Years, Absolute 
Change in Percent Hispanic, and Ethnicity 
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Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to examine time trends in the sentencing of 
Hispanic noncitizens because of the increase in punitive attitudes toward undocumented 
Hispanic immigrants in the past two decades. Accordingly, two hypotheses were 
developed that stated ethnic disparity within immigration cases should increase over time 
and that the trend in ethnic disparity should be more pronounced in districts with a large 
Hispanic population. The findings partially supported the hypotheses. While the three-
way interaction model suggested that Hispanic noncitizens were treated more leniently 
over time, Hispanic defendants received the harshest treatment in districts with the 
greatest growth in the ethnic composition, thus partially supporting group threat theory. 
There are several reasons that Hispanic noncitizens may have received harsher 
treatment in the 1990s in districts with the greatest growth in the Hispanic population. 
First, the most rapid growth of undocumented Hispanic immigrants occurred during the 
1990s and leveled off at the turn of the decade. While punitive rhetoric and perceptions 
have increased over time, the pattern of Hispanic population growth would indicate that a 
threshold effect may have been reached that would account for the decrease in ethnic 
disparity over time.  
 Second, Eagly (2010) predicted that sentence lengths for immigration cases 
should decrease over time as the criminal and immigration law increasingly intersect. She 
describes how federal courts reorient toward border screening when immigration 
prosecutions peak. Border screening focuses on rapid conviction and deportation in 
“assembly line” type fashion. Accordingly, the rights of the accused and due process 
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diminish, whereas guilty pleas increase for illegal entry and reentry offenses and sentence 
lengths for immigration cases decrease. Eagly (2010) provides examples where 
defendants begin to be processed and deported in large groups. Her description of the 
federal court as a border screening agent aptly applies to the current sentencing of 
immigration cases. The majority of immigration cases are illegal entry or reentry offenses 
that are rapidly processed through federal magistrate court or through fast-track plea 
bargaining. In addition, the current study occurred during the time period where the 
criminal justice and civil system increasingly intersected, especially in districts with a 
large and growing Latino population (Stumpf, 2006). Therefore, the decrease in sentence 
lengths over time in districts with the greatest change in percent Hispanic may indicate 
that civil sanctions, such as deportation, may have shortened the length of time that 
Hispanic noncitizens were incarcerated.   
The findings from this study offer two avenues for future research. First, the 
present study only examined time and immigrant population growth linearly. Examining 
nonlinear sentencing and ethnic population growth trends would provide a more accurate 
depiction of when precisely sentence lengths began decreasing. If punitive sentences 
increase then diminish over time and in districts where the Hispanic population reached a 
threshold, then group threat theory would be the more likely explanation of why sentence 
lengths decreased over time. Second, future studies should include information on 
deportations and prosecutorial practices when examining time trends in the sentencing of 
immigration cases. If trends in sentence lengths decrease while deportations increase and 
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time to conviction decreases, then the federal court orientation toward immigration 
screening may be the more likely explanation.  
Conclusion 
Prior research on citizenship, minority threat, and sentencing has demonstrated 
the importance of time for detecting sentencing disparity. Moreover, punitive attitudes 
toward undocumented Hispanic immigrants have increased in recent decades. Together, 
these two bodies of research suggest that ethnic disparity may have increased over time 
and within districts with the largest growth in the Hispanic population. While the present 
study did find an interaction between ethnicity, time, and Hispanic population growth, the 
findings were unexpected and inconsistent with prior research. Further research is needed 
to parse out the reason why Hispanic noncitizen defendants in immigration cases received 
more lenient sentences over time in districts with the greatest growth in Hispanic 
population size.  
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Summary of findings 
      A growing concern among immigration scholars is that the civil and criminal 
justice systems have intersected in a way that is detrimental to immigration offenders, 
particularly immigrants of color. Because of the overlap between the criminal and civil 
immigration systems, immigration cases in the federal court are uniquely handled. 
Consequently, quantitative studies have been noticeably absent in the crimmigration 
literature and observations on the increasing punitive context surrounding immigration 
cases in the federal courts have been speculative. This dissertation attempted to fill this 
gap by conducting a comprehensive analysis in the federal courts that separated 
immigration cases from other offense types. The analysis proceeded in three stages by 
examining cumulative disadvantage within immigration cases, contextual disparity within 
immigration cases, and ethnic disparity over time within immigration cases.    
Overall, the findings revealed that cumulative disadvantage exists within 
immigration cases, contextual disparity is present within immigration cases but depends 
on the court outcome, and ethnic disparity decreases over time in districts with larger 
Hispanic population growth. Regarding cumulative disadvantage within immigration 
cases, black Hispanic noncitizens consistently received more severe sanctions than white 
non-Hispanic noncitizens over multiple federal decision points. Similarly, black non-
Hispanic noncitizens were also disadvantaged at multiple stages throughout the federal 
court process. White Hispanic noncitizens were treated more harshly than white non-
Hispanic noncitizens at most federal court decision points. Lastly, Asian defendants were 
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treated more harshly than white non-Hispanic noncitizens for some court outcomes, but 
the overall effect for Asian noncitizen defendants was not significantly different than 
white non-Hispanic noncitizens.  
For contextual disparity within immigration cases, Hispanic population size 
affected presentence detention and early disposition, and absolute change in Hispanic 
population size was also significantly related to early disposition. Specifically, Hispanic 
population size positively impacted presentence detention then leveled off. Hispanic 
population size and absolute change in percent Hispanic also exhibited positive but linear 
relationships with early disposition. Moreover, absolute change in percent Hispanic 
significantly interacted with ethnicity for presentence detention and guideline departure 
where absolute change in percent Hispanic decreased the likelihood of presentence 
detention and increased the likelihood of downward departure for Hispanic noncitizens. 
Finally, although the three-way interaction model demonstrated that ethnic 
disparity decreased over time in districts with a greater absolute change in percent 
Hispanic, overall little support for the hypotheses was found from the longitudinal 
analysis that examined ethnic disparity over time.  
Theoretical Implications 
The findings from this dissertation have several theoretical implications. First, the 
results are consistent with the focal concerns perspective and support the use of a 
cumulative disadvantage approach. Second, support for the minority threat perspective is 
limited. Third, together the findings point to larger institutional factors where racial and 
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ethnic bias is structured into the practices and interactions of the courtroom workgroup 
beyond any individual actor. The following section will address each point.  
The harsher treatment of black Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, and white Hispanic 
noncitizens within immigration cases may suggest support for the focal concerns 
perspective. The focal concerns perspective was originally formulated to address harsher 
sentencing of young, black males (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and 
Kramer (1998) noted that prevailing racial stereotypes associate young, black males with 
crime and influence judicial decision making. Stereotypes of young, black males as 
criminally prone stem from the United States’ prolonged history of using the criminal 
justice system as a tool of racial oppression (Kennedy, 1997; Massey, 2007). In the wake 
of emancipation, African Americans were often targeted for petty and minor crimes that 
resulted in lengthy sentences in contract labor prisons (Oshinsky, 1996). Essentially, the 
criminal justice system became a new form of slavery in the South. Overt racism 
continued to characterize the criminal justice process throughout the early 20th century 
exemplified in cases like the Scottsboro Boys where nine African American young men 
were falsely accused of rape and sentenced to death in a matter of days (Acker, 2008).  
Overt racism by actors in the criminal justice system seemed to dissipate in the 
later part of the 20th century with advances through the Civil Rights Movement and 
reforms aimed at making the criminal justice system equal and more uniform (Spohn, 
2015; Zatz, 1987). Nevertheless, the perceptual link between race and crime persisted and 
has been exploited by politicians for political gain (Jacobs & Helms, 1996; Tonry, 2011). 
Sparked by Barry Goldwater’s campaign in the 1960s, the Republican Party added 
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getting “tough-on-crime” to their platform to widen their political base by appealing to 
white Southern voters (Jacobs & Helms, 1996; Tonry, 1995, 2011). Based on the 
Republican Party’s success of law-and order politics, the Democratic Party also included 
crime as an issue in their platform (Beckett & Sasson, 2000). As a result, the 1980s and 
1990s ushered in an era of punitive policies with racialized undertones, such as the War 
on Drugs, the War on Crime, habitual offender laws, truth-in-sentencing, mandatory 
minimums, and determinant sentencing (Alexander, 2012; Chambliss, 1995; Tonry, 1995, 
2011). In practice, law enforcement targeted poor, minority communities and young, 
minority males received the brunt of “tough-on-crime” policies (Alexander, 2012; 
Chambliss, 1995).  
While race is deeply embedded with the concept of crime in America and has led 
to a robust body of research on race and punishment, sentencing scholars have also 
applied the focal concerns perspective to ethnicity and citizenship. The recent interest in 
ethnic disparity and citizenship has been sparked in part by the wave of immigration 
beginning in the 1980s (Mears, 2001; Sampson, 2008) and a nation-wide political agenda 
that harshly responded to the growing number of Latino immigrants (Hagan et al., 2008; 
Stumpf, 2006). As Russell-Brown (2009) observed, Latino males have become “second 
in line – behind African Americans – as the face of the feared American criminal” 
(Russell-Brown, 2009, p. 16). Indeed, recent courts and sentencing studies have 
demonstrated that the focal concerns perspective can be generalized to ethnicity and 
citizenship status. Research reveals that Hispanic defendants receive harsher treatment 
than white non-Hispanic defendants, and that noncitizen defendants receive more severe 
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treatment than citizen defendants (Demuth, 2003; Demuth & Steffensmeier, 2004; 
Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2011; Light, 2014; Light, et al., 2014; Spohn & Holleran, 2000; 
Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000, 2001; Ulmer, Kurlychek, & Kramer, 2007; Wolfe, 
Pyrooz, & Spohn, 2011).  
The present study builds on previous work by finding that racial and ethnic 
disparity exists within a sample of noncitizen defendants and within immigration cases. 
Immigration scholars have noted that citizenship status is more nuanced than simple 
binary categories. Instead, citizenship has been cast in terms of race and ethnicity, where 
noncitizens and “illegal aliens” refer to immigrants of color (Chacon, 2007; Hainmueller 
& Hopkins, 2014; Johnson, 1996). Linking immigrants of color to crime extends back to 
the act of criminalizing unauthorized entry into the United States – a method used to 
enforce the quota system established to control the racial makeup of the country during a 
wave of immigration in the early 20th century (Chacon, 2007; Ngai, 1999). Since then, 
criminal stereotypes of immigrants of color have resurfaced during periods of rapid 
immigrant population growth or terroristic threat (Chacon, 2007).  
The past three decades have seen an unprecedented focus on immigrants of color 
when a wave of immigration in the 1980s and 1990s coincided with a series of terroristic 
incidents (Wadhia, 2010; Welch, 2003). As a response, criminalization of immigration 
has expanded drastically, and immigrants of color have been further demonized (Kubrin, 
Zatz, & Martinez, 2012; Martinez & Valenzuela, 2006; Medina, 2006; Zatz & Smith, 
2012). While immigration scholars have observed that criminal stereotypes of noncitizens 
of color have influenced equality in the administration of justice (Chacon, 2007; Hagan, 
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et al., 2008; Hagan & Palloni, 1999; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Stumpf, 2006; Zatz & 
Smith, 2012; Wang, 2012), little empirical work has assessed the influence of race and 
ethnicity within noncitizens and within immigration cases. The present study supports 
immigration scholars’ claims by finding that variation exists according to race and 
ethnicity within noncitizens and within immigration cases. Findings indicate that 
prevailing criminal stereotypes of noncitizens of color may influence courtroom actors’ 
assessment of blameworthiness and dangerousness, thereby resulting in harsher treatment 
of noncitizens of color throughout the federal court system.  
The present study also supports using a cumulative disadvantage approach 
because racial and ethnic disparity was not uniform across all decision points. For 
example, disparity was present at presentence detention, early disposition, and at 
guideline departure for certain racial and ethnic groups. Moreover, stages that did not 
exhibit significant direct effects of race and ethnicity were influenced through previous 
stages. Accordingly, inaccurate conclusions could be drawn if the empirical analysis had 
examined a singular decision point. If charge reduction or sentence length was the only 
stage examined, then the conclusion could be that defendants of color are treated 
similarly to white non-Hispanic defendants. In reality, defendants of color received 
harsher treatment than white non-Hispanic defendants at multiple stages of the federal 
court process. A cumulative disadvantage approach accounts for the unique context of 
each decision point and the dynamic process of federal court decision making. Moreover, 
it can identify subtle disparities that accumulate to the detriment of defendants of color 
that may not be detectable at a single stage.  
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Overall, a cumulative disadvantage approach revealed that federal court outcomes 
presided over by prosecutors and federal magistrate judges were consistently influenced 
by race and ethnicity, and early disposition is a unique decision point for white Hispanic 
defendants. Racial and ethnic disparity at the front end of the federal court system is 
unsurprising given the authority, greater discretion, and lack of accountability that 
prosecutors and federal magistrate judges carry in disposing immigration cases (see 
Albonetti, 1987; Hartley, et al., 2007; Shermer & Johnson, 2010; Spohn & Fornango, 
2009). Differential treatment of white Hispanic defendants at early disposition may 
represent the greater likelihood of deportation as part of their early disposition deals. As 
discussed in greater detail, the cumulative disadvantage approach is equipped to provide 
quantitative patterns of racial and ethnic disparity, but other methods or data are needed 
to explain why these patterns exist.  
Evidence for the minority and group threat perspectives is limited. What the 
findings suggest is that context matters for certain decision points but not always in 
theoretically expected ways. The effect of ethnic context on presentence detention 
suggests support for the minority threat perspective when examined for all defendants 
(see Blalock, 1967). As the Hispanic population size increased, so did the likelihood of 
receiving presentence detention until the Hispanic population size reached a tipping point 
and leveled off. For early disposition and the subsequent significant interaction terms, 
however, early disposition was more likely to occur as the Hispanic population size and 
absolute change in the Hispanic population increased. Regarding the interaction terms 
between ethnic composition and ethnicity, results were opposite of what was predicted. 
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Hispanic defendants received more lenient treatment at presentence detention and 
downward departure where there was a greater absolute change in percent Hispanic. In 
addition, sentencing of Hispanic defendants became more lenient over time in districts 
with the greatest absolute change in percent Hispanic. Although the findings were 
contrary to what would be expected according to the minority threat perspective, previous 
research testing this perspective has been mixed (see Ulmer, 2012). Therefore, the results 
align with some previous studies.  
Together, the results reveal a pattern that suggests support for the crimmigration 
literature that proposes the civil and federal systems have intersected to create a 
diminished form of justice. Crimmigration is reflected in the lack of a trial penalty within 
immigration cases, improved outcomes when using a private attorney, the low case 
declination rate, the high rate of detention, missing data in presentence detention, the less 
severe punishment for those who are referred from the Department of Homeland 
Security, and high rates of early disposition.  Moreover, crimmigration has disparately 
impacted noncitizens of color who are more likely to be detained, are disadvantaged at 
early disposition, and who are less likely to receive a charge reduction or sentence length 
because of the indirect or total effect of race/ethnicity. The results point to 
institutionalized racial and ethnic bias in the federal court processing of immigration 
cases. The findings parallel Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve’s (2016) recent work that 
illuminates how racial and ethnic bias is embedded in the criminal justice system’s 
structure that informs the norms, values, and routines of the courtroom workgroup 
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ultimately shaping their practices and decisions.  Overall, the findings leave several 
avenues for future research.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
First, future research should use qualitative methods to shed light on the reasons 
behind the quantitative patterns uncovered by this dissertation. Sentencing scholars have 
recently called for qualitative methods to better understand courtroom actors’ decision 
making (Baumer, 2013). Besides a handful of studies that have answered recent calls 
(e.g. Clair & Winter, 2016), qualitative or mixed-methods sentencing work has been 
limited. Qualitative methods could confirm whether noncitizens of color are linked to 
harsher sentencing outcomes through the three focal concerns or whether other 
mechanisms are at play. Furthermore, qualitative methods could illuminate if the reason 
white Hispanic noncitizens are more likely to receive early disposition compared to their 
white non-Hispanic counterparts is due to harsher civil sanctions, such as deportation. 
Similarly, qualitative methods could enlighten if Hispanic defendants are more likely to 
receive early disposition and downward departures in districts with a greater absolute 
change in the size of the Hispanic population because of constraints on the courts, 
changes in perceptions of dangerousness, or increased use of civil sanctions.  
Second and relatedly, future research that examines the processing of immigration 
cases needs to incorporate data from the civil courts. As previously discussed at length, 
the criminal and civil systems have integrated in a detrimental way to noncitizens 
entering the civil or criminal justice systems for immigration related violations. The civil 
immigration system has mirrored the criminal justice system in its processing of civil 
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immigration cases through increased enforcement, detention, and attached criminal 
sanctions (Eagly, 2010; Legomsky, 2007; Stumpf, 2006). On the other hand, diminished 
due process for criminal immigration cases is reflected in case screening by civil actors, 
detention without a proper hearing or using the civil system for detention, and the use of 
early disposition agreements that may include deportation (Eagly, 2010).  
Only studying one system involved in the processing of immigration cases does 
not provide a full picture of the extent to which noncitizens of color may be 
disadvantaged in comparison to their white non-Hispanic counterparts. For example, 
white Hispanic noncitizens are more likely to receive early disposition agreements. While 
early disposition agreements result in decreased sentence lengths, they may also result in 
an increased likelihood of deportation. In the same vein, areas with a greater absolute 
change in the Hispanic population may also use early disposition to increase deportations. 
Without civil data to supplement criminal justice outcomes, a full understanding of how 
immigration cases are processed in federal courts cannot be reached.  
 Third, future empirical research on the processing of immigration cases should 
focus on arrest. This dissertation began with outcomes after immigration cases entered 
federal courts. While federal court actors have a hand in shaping the way federal 
immigration cases are concluded, law enforcement officers arguably have the greatest 
discretion in determining who is processed for civil and criminal immigration offenses 
(Motomura, 2011; Provine et al., 2016). Law enforcement officers are the gatekeepers in 
all criminal cases (Mastrofski, 2004), but this is particularly true for immigration offenses 
considering the restricted variation in federal court outcomes within immigration cases. 
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Moreover, recent controversial policies, such as Arizona’s SB 1070, facilitate racial and 
ethnic profiling in arrests for immigration cases (Provine et al., 2016). Therefore, 
knowing the factors that influence arrest decisions in immigration cases may expose a 
potentially significant source of racial and ethnic inequality in the processing of 
noncitizens for immigration offenses. Moreover, the lack of arrest data and available 
measures of ethnicity at case filing presents issues with selection bias. Future research 
that has available information on arrest and ethnicity at the front end of the court process 
should replicate this study to determine the influence selection has on later stages.  
 Fourth, a measure indicating whether a community is a new or traditional 
receiving community would make a great addition to the current analysis because recent 
literature suggests new destinations may perceive the greatest threat and respond 
punitively. Unfortunately, because federal districts are so large, some districts contain old 
and new destinations. For example, the district of Southern Florida contains both Miami, 
an old destination, and West Palm Beach, a new destination (see Singer, 2004). 
Accordingly, the effects of new receiving areas may be masked by the effects of 
traditional receiving areas. Nevertheless, future research may address this limitation by 
examining the impact of racial/ethnic threat within immigration cases at a lower level of 
aggregation, such as at the city or county level. In addition, perceptual measures of 
minority threat should be used to identify the mechanisms linking Hispanic population 
size to presentence detention and early disposition.  
 Similarly, prior research has measured immigrant concentration in many ways. 
Some studies measure immigrant concentration as percent foreign-born and percent 
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Hispanic in one combined measure (MacDonald, Hipp, & Gill, 2013; Sampson, 
Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). Others have measured it as percent Hispanic who are 
foreign-born or percent foreign-born (Feldmeyer, 2009). Because percent Hispanic has 
more variation than percent foreign-born across federal districts, the present analysis kept 
them separated, thus future research should see if a combined measure would result in 
different findings. 
Policy Implications 
One of the main takeaways from the current dissertation is that noncitizens of 
color receive harsher treatment at multiple stages throughout the federal court process 
within immigration cases compared to their white non-Hispanic counterparts. Given the 
punitive rhetoric surrounding immigration cases and the dismantling of due process 
protections for criminal immigration offenders, inequality in the administration of justice 
is not surprising. Nevertheless, the perception of noncitizens of color as perceived 
criminal threats stands in stark contrast to research that has empirically examined whether 
immigrants and whether Latino immigrants in particular pose an objective criminal 
threat.   
In the past decade, a proliferation of research has been conducted on the link 
between Latino immigration and crime due in part to the reemergence of social 
disorganization theory and to the moral panic surrounding immigration since the 1990s. 
Most of the empirical research has been at the macro-level and has tested associations 
between concentrated immigration and crime rates controlling for possible confounding 
variables. This body of research has found that areas of concentrated Latino immigration 
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were either negatively linked with crime (Graif & Sampson, 2009; Hagan & Palloni, 
1999; MacDonald, Hipp, & Gill, 2012; Martinez & Lee, 2000; Nielsen, Lee, & Martinez, 
2005; Ousey, & Kubrin, 2009; 2017) or exhibited null effects (Akins, Rumbaut, & 
Stanfield, 2009; Alaniz, Cartmill, & Parker, 1998; Lee, Martinez, & Rosenfeld, 2001; 
Martinez, 2000). The consistent negative or null relationship between immigration and 
crime has become known as the “Latino Paradox”.  
Several researchers have further investigated areas of concentrated immigration 
and observed that ethnic enclaves contain dense ties (Feldmeyer, Madero-Hernandez, 
Rojas-Gaona, & Sabon; Sampson, Morenoff, & Raudenbush, 2005). Families in these 
areas also have close relationships with neighbors who share similar values and help to 
increase social control (Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010a; Chiswick & Miller, 2005; Jones-
Webb &Wall, 2008). Shihadeh and Barranco (2010a) found that new immigration 
activates social ties through increased communication and networking. In addition, ethnic 
enclaves often contain an economy of ethnic foods and goods which offer job 
opportunities even though these opportunities are usually located in the secondary labor 
market (Martinez, Lee, & Nielson, 2004). Martinez, Lee, and Nielson (2004) found that 
working in the secondary labor force in ethnic enclaves reduced the likelihood of 
violence compared to disadvantaged areas which did not have a self-sustaining secondary 
labor market.  
More recently, however, immigrants have begun to settle in new destinations (see 
Durand, Massey, & Charvet, 2000; Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013; Reid, Weis, Adelman, & 
Jaret, 2005; Ulmer, Harris, & Steffensmeier, 2012). Settlement in emerging immigrant 
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destinations is partially a result of labor stagnation in ethnic enclaves as well as tighter 
enforcement along the U.S.-Mexico border where immigrants traditionally cross 
(Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010b). In these new locations, one study found that immigration 
was positively associated with violence (Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013), yet studies that 
further investigated crime in new destinations found that over time immigration had a 
similar crime reducing effect and a positive economic impact in non-traditional receiving 
areas (Crowley & Lichter, 2009; Ferraro, 2016; MacDonald, Hipp, & Gill, 2013).  
Macro-level research, however, does not provide insight into whether immigrants 
are likely to commit crime at the individual-level, and little research has examined 
whether noncitizens of color individually are more likely to commit crime. An 
informative body of literature has examined the effect of immigrant generation status on 
crime, and foreign-born immigrants have been repeatedly less likely to commit 
delinquency compared to their native-born counterparts (Alba & Nee, 1997; Bersani, 
2014; Bui & Thongniramol, 2012; Butcher & Piehl, 1998; DiPietro & McGloin, 2012; 
Martinez & Lee, 2000; Miller & Gibson, 2011; Myers et al., 2009; Samaniego & 
Gonzales, 1999; Zhou, 1997).  
Together then, the empirical literature on the link between immigration and crime 
contradicts the punitive rhetoric vilifying Hispanic immigrants as national security and 
criminal threats. Instead, Sampson (2008) notes that rather than posing harmful threats,  
“immigration and the increasing cultural diversity that accompanies it generate 
the sorts of conflicts of culture that lead not to increased crime but nearly the 
opposite. In other words, selective immigration in the current era may be leading 
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to greater visibility of competing non-violent mores that affect not just immigrant 
communities but diffuse and concatenate through social interactions to tamp down 
violent conflict in general (p. 33).”  
Accordingly, the negative relationship between Latino immigration and crime 
indicates that the amount of resources spent on enforcing and processing immigration 
related offenses may be unnecessary from a security standpoint. Meissner and colleagues 
(2013) have documented the tremendous growth in spending during the shift from the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). Spending on immigration enforcement increased to $17.9 billion in 2012 which is 
over 15 times greater than spending on immigration enforcement during the INS. Not 
only is immigration enforcement a financial burden, the focus on convicting and 
deporting for civil and criminal immigration offenses may be doing the country a 
disservice since research has revealed that Latino immigrants have a positive influence on 
the areas they settle in.  
Nevertheless, the 2016 presidential election of Donald Trump drove the United 
States in a more punitive direction regarding immigration from the U.S.–Mexico border. 
A Gallup Poll showed that the two words most associated with President Trump’s 
campaign in the months prior to his win over Presidential Candidate Hillary Clinton were 
“immigration” and “Mexico” (Newport, Singh, Soroka, Traugott, & Dugan, 2016). Since 
his inauguration, Hispanic noncitizens have continued to be targeted with the repeal of 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) – a program granting safety to 
undocumented immigrants brought to the United States as children (Kopan, 2017). In 
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addition, President Trump has taken a hardline stance toward undocumented immigration 
through aggressive arrests and deportation from within the United States (Sacchetti, 
2017). More recently, the Trump Administration has pledged to reduce the backlogs to 
the civil immigration system by speeding up deportation delays and adding more judges 
to immigration courts (Sacchetti, 2017). 
Indeed, it has become apparent that immigration policy and legislation have not 
been informed by research. Instead, policy and research on immigration have diverged in 
opposite directions over the past decade. Ironically, while research has repeatedly refuted 
the stereotype of Hispanic immigrants as dangerously criminal (see Hagan & Palloni, 
1999; Sampson, 2008), immigration policy and legislation have further criminalized 
immigration, sending an unprecedented number of immigration cases through the federal 
courts (see Eagly, 2010; Stumpf, 2006). Consequently, the results from this dissertation 
show that racial and ethnic inequality exists within immigration cases where noncitizens 
of color are treated more harshly than their white counterparts. Therefore, as immigration 
offenses become a larger portion of cases in the federal court system, fairness and 
equality in the administration of justice become an ever-pressing issue as immigration 
and crime research provides no justification for the more punitive treatment of 
immigrants of color.  
Conclusion 
Historically, the United States has a conflicting narrative on immigration: on the 
one hand, welcoming immigration; on the other hand, employing social control to 
exclude certain types of immigrants from changing the racial and ethnic makeup of the 
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United States (Ogletree, 2000). Recent decades have seen an exceptional effort to 
criminalize and police immigrants of color resulting in fundamental changes to both the 
criminal justice and civil immigration systems (Stumpf, 2006; Welch, 2012). The 
punitive context targeting immigrants has elicited concern over civil liberty issues. 
Accordingly, the purpose of this dissertation was to provide a comprehensive assessment 
on racial and ethnic disparity in the federal court processing of immigration cases. The 
findings revealed cumulative disadvantage within immigration cases, contextual disparity 
for some decision points within immigration cases, and diminished ethnic disparity 
within immigration cases over time in districts with a greater absolute change in Hispanic 
population growth. The findings further bolster arguments that noncitizens of color have 
been unduly burdened by the increasingly punitive enforcement of criminal immigration 
offenses.  
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